Priors, Learning, Experimentation and Persuasion in Entrepreneurial Finance

Ramana Nanda

1st Bayesian Entrepreneurship Conference March 22, 2024



• Application of Bayesian Entrepreneurship ideas in research, teaching and practice of entrepreneurial finance

• Financing Deep Tech Entrepreneurship (at Imperial)


• A few additional Random thoughts

Multi-stage financing

• Regardless of my priors, there are instances where I need to convince others to give me money to get my venture off the ground

- Some 'advisable' actions
 - Break financing into stages (where investor has right to abandon)
 - Tied to milestones that enable value-inflection if the milestone is achieved (e.g. *step-up in value* from Series A to B)
- Related to the literature on real options in multi-stage financing

PANEL A: ALL OR NOTHING BET



How much can I learn at what cost?

- You raise money to buy time
- You buy time to run experiments
- You run experiments to produce information
- You produce information to make decisions (open or close options)
- Experiments that cost less and generate more information are therefore more valuable Real Options!

Some Implications

- Value inflection across rounds:
 - Tied to surprises: If I thought it wasn't going to work, but it did, I update my priors more as an investor
 - 'High bar' experiments generate more information for the (skeptical) investor (good for entrepreneur if successful since less diluted but also means more likely to fail)

- Clear guidance on how much to raise:
 - How much do I need to get to the next value inflection point? (Plus a little more for unanticipated needs)

Airbnb Financing Rounds


AirBnB Financings

		3 m	nonths 11 a	months 7 mo	onths 16 mo	onths 16 mo	onths 14 mont	ths 14 mor	nths		
		Seed	Seed	Series A	Series B	Series C	Series D	Series E	Series F		Total Raised
		1/2009	<u>4/2009</u>	<u>11/2010</u>	<u>6/2011</u>	<u>10/2012</u>	<u>4/2014</u>	<u>6/2015</u>	<u>9/2016</u>		<u>(\$ 000)</u>
Investment (\$ 00	0)	\$20	\$600	\$7,200	\$117,052	\$200,000	\$ 4 75,000	\$1,500,000	\$555,500		\$2,855,372
		6									(\$2.9 billion)
% Purchased		6.0%	20.0%	7.2%	9.0%	8.0%	4.8%	5.9 %	1.9%		
Post Money Valı	1e (\$ 000)	\$333	\$3,000	\$100,000	\$1,300,000	\$2,500,000	\$10,000,000	\$25,500,000	\$29,700,000		
5											
N N 771	(# 000)	#010	40.400	#00.000	AT 100 040	40,000,000		A04 000 000			
Pre Money Valu	ation (\$ 000)	\$313	\$2,400	\$92,800	\$1,182,948	\$2,300,000	\$9,525,000	\$24,000,000	\$29,144,500		
			7.2 x	31 x 11.	8x 1	.8 x 3	3.8 x 2.4	1x 1.	2 x		
			Q	Capitalization Tal	<u>ple</u>						
	Pre	Seed	Seed	Series A	Corion D		(Allocation @
	<u>Funding</u>	<u>1/2009</u>	<u>4/2009</u>	<u>11/2010</u>	Series B <u>6/2011</u>	Series C <u>10/2012</u>	Series D <u>4/2014</u>	Series E <u>6/2015</u>	Series F <u>9/2016</u>	W/ Est <u>Options</u>	\$29,700,000 (\$ 000)
Founders			<u>4/2009</u>	<u>11/2010</u>	<u>6/2011</u>	<u>10/2012</u>	<u>4/2014</u>	<u>6/2015</u>	<u>9/2016</u>	Options	<u>(\$ 000)</u>
Founders Y Combinator	<u>Funding</u> 100.0%	<u>1/2009</u> 94.0% 6.0%								-	
Y Combinator		94.0%	<u>4/2009</u> 75.2%	<u>11/2010</u> 69.8%	<u>6/2011</u> 63.5%	<u>10/2012</u> 58.4%	<u>4/2014</u> 55.6%	<u>6/2015</u> 52.4%	<u>9/2016</u> 51.4%	<u>Options</u> 46.3%	<u>(\$ 000)</u> \$13,737,608
		94.0%	<u>4/2009</u> 75.2% 4.8%	<u>11/2010</u> 69.8% 4.5%	<u>6/2011</u> 63.5% 4.1%	<u>10/2012</u> 58.4% 3.7%	<u>4/2014</u> 55.6% 3.6%	<u>6/2015</u> 52.4% 3.3%	<u>9/2016</u> 51.4% 3.3%	<u>Options</u> 46.3% 3.0%	<u>(\$ 000)</u> \$13,737,608 876,869
Y Combinator Seed 1 Sequioa		94.0%	<u>4/2009</u> 75.2% 4.8%	<u>11/2010</u> 69.8% 4.5% 18.6%	<u>6/2011</u> 63.5% 4.1% 16.9%	<u>10/2012</u> 58.4% 3.7% 15.5%	<u>4/2014</u> 55.6% 3.6% 14.8%	<u>6/2015</u> 52.4% 3.3% 13.9%	<u>9/2016</u> 51.4% 3.3% 13.7%	<u>Options</u> 46.3% 3.0% 12.3%	(<u>\$ 000)</u> \$13,737,608 876,869 3,653,619
Y Combinator Seed 1 Sequioa Series A		94.0%	<u>4/2009</u> 75.2% 4.8%	<u>11/2010</u> 69.8% 4.5% 18.6%	<u>6/2011</u> 63.5% 4.1% 16.9% 6.6%	<u>10/2012</u> 58.4% 3.7% 15.5% 6.0%	<u>4/2014</u> 55.6% 3.6% 14.8% 5.7%	<u>6/2015</u> 52.4% 3.3% 13.9% 5.4%	<u>9/2016</u> 51.4% 3.3% 13.7% 5.3%	Options 46.3% 3.0% 12.3% 4.8%	(\$ 000) \$13,737,608 876,869 3,653,619 1,417,352
Y Combinator Seed 1 Sequioa Series A Series B		94.0%	<u>4/2009</u> 75.2% 4.8%	<u>11/2010</u> 69.8% 4.5% 18.6%	<u>6/2011</u> 63.5% 4.1% 16.9% 6.6%	<u>10/2012</u> 58.4% 3.7% 15.5% 6.0% 8.3%	<u>4/2014</u> 55.6% 3.6% 14.8% 5.7% 7.9%	<u>6/2015</u> 52.4% 3.3% 13.9% 5.4% 7.4%	<u>9/2016</u> 51.4% 3.3% 13.7% 5.3% 7.3%	Options 46.3% 3.0% 12.3% 4.8% 6.6%	(\$ 000) \$13,737,608 876,869 3,653,619 1,417,352 1,947,863
Y Combinator Seed 1 Sequioa Series A Series B Series C Series D Series E		94.0%	<u>4/2009</u> 75.2% 4.8%	<u>11/2010</u> 69.8% 4.5% 18.6%	<u>6/2011</u> 63.5% 4.1% 16.9% 6.6%	<u>10/2012</u> 58.4% 3.7% 15.5% 6.0% 8.3%	<u>4/2014</u> 55.6% 3.6% 14.8% 5.7% 7.9% 7.6%	<u>6/2015</u> 52.4% 3.3% 13.9% 5.4% 7.4% 7.2%	<u>9/2016</u> 51.4% 3.3% 13.7% 5.3% 7.3% 7.0% 4.4% 5.8%	Options 46.3% 3.0% 12.3% 4.8% 6.6% 6.3% 3.9% 5.2%	(\$ 000) \$13,737,608 876,869 3,653,619 1,417,352 1,947,863 1,881,157 1,172,638 1,542,944
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Source: seed-db.com and various public and government sources. For illustrative purposes only.



Massive growth in VC industry not evenly distributed across sectors



- Particular dearth in capital towards "deep tech" sectors that build on fundamental science and engineering innovations
- Critical to solving global challenges in climate, sustainability, health, defense
- These innovations are increasingly developed inside universities as larger companies pull back

Source: Nanda, Ramana. "Financing 'Tough Tech' Innovation." Chap. 5 in Global Innovation Index 2020: Who will Finance Innovation? Data Source: Pitchbook

Lots of potential reasons, focus on one here:

- "Low learning efficacy"
 - Early experiments, even when successful, seem to be less predictive of ultimate success (low initial step-ups)
 - Particularly problematic when combined with the larger costs associated with financing these early experiments

Examples of low learning efficacy

The long-term stability of an electrocatalyst [..] is a crucial financial factor for evaluating the prospects of a novel material. So far, long-term experiments > 24 h at relevant current densities are not that frequently employed in catalyst studies. Given the fact, that an industrial setup has to remain operational for several years, degradation effects of even as low as 0.1% over 24h are not negligible, and materials thus cannot be claimed stable. **Hence, either long-time experiments have to be conducted or new rapid-aging tests have to be developed.**

Many of the tested catalytic materials are currently benchmarked at rather low current densities. These data sets are not meaningful for any commercial processes and are obtained outside of the common process conditions that are applied. It would be particularly desirable to at least test such a system at higher current densities of \$>500 mA cm2\$ to establish the systems performance...

Preclinical experiments in isolated systems (cells, tissue preparations, isolated organs) together with animal disease models, which are used for the identification and validation of drug targets to progress into clinical phase testing, **turn out to be poorly predictive of human efficacy**

Rationales for low learning efficacy

- Fundamental differences in predictability (lab exp vs. customer discovery)
- Lack of well developed benchmarks that allow updating from experiments
- Moral Hazard in Experiment Design

Lack of well developed benchmarks (compared to Enterprise Software)

Exhibit 7 Metrics to Benchmark Performance of SaaS Companies with a \$6 million to \$10 million Revenue Run Rate

	Revenue Growth (Trailing 12mo.)	Revenue Growth (Forward 12mo.)	Sales Efficiency (Magic Number)	Net Retention (Revenue Churn Net, Annualized)	Cash Burn (Operating Income as % Revenue)
25 th Percentile	78%	55%	0.5x	-4.3%	-138%
50 th Percentile	117%	84%	0.8x	8.3%	-93%
75 th Percentile	157%	114%	1.4x	32.9%	-49%
Number of Observations	93	118	108	74	128

Source: Adapted from Rory O'Driscoll, "Four Vital Signs of SaaS," Scale Venture Partners, March 2019, https://www.scalevp.com/insights/four-vital-signs-of-saas/, accessed February 2024.

Moral Hazard in Experiment Design

- Investor can see whether milestone achieved but entrepreneur can design the experiment to be more or less likely to achieve the milestone
- Leads to large inefficiency and potential for market failure
- One potential solution is for university to help validate the experiment design


DT Prime program at Imperial

Decarbonization and Sustainability Related Industrial Technologies



Sodium-Ion Battery Anodes (1,2) Low Carbon Concrete (1) Low Carbon Ammonia (1) Perovskite Solar Cells (2,3) Arsenic removal from water (2,3) Catalytic Process for Crop Yield Enhancement (3)

Therapeutics and Biotech Platforms



Zinc Finger Gene Therapy (1,2,3)

Self-amplifying RNA platform for vaccine and therapeutic indications (3)

CAR-MAIT-based immunotherapy for cancers (3)

Bio-inspired Nanomedicines for Targeted Thrombolytic Therapy (2,3)

Left ventricle cardiomyocytes based cell replacement therapy for heart failure (3)

Revolutionary approach to therapeutic peptide synthesis (2)

Platform for discovery of new antibiotics (1)

Information and Communication Technology



Neuromorphic Computing hardware (1, 3)

Retinomorphic Computing for Machine Vision (3)

MASER (Microwave Amplification Stimulated Emission of Radiation) in a Box (2)

MedTech and Digital Health



Device for cartilage regeneration (1) Device to stimulate bone growth (2)

Soft Robot for Endoscopic surgery (2,3)

New adjuvant to accelerate closure of diabetic foot ulcers (1)

Hydrophobic material to substantially reduce blood loss from severe bleeding (2)

Random thoughts

- My prior is that we are really onto something here
 - Scientific, actionable (teachable) approach to decision making under uncertainty that nests easily within language of practitioners, at least in entrepreneurial finance
 - But of course I am optimistic, after all I was invited and chose to attend!
- May need to do more to persuade our counterparts in the literature who don't share the prior
 - Word choice matters
 - May need to balance the tradeoff between being comprehensive and easy enough to be appealing, otherwise risk remaining fragmented