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authenticator_common.cc
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authenticator_common.cc
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// Copyright 2019 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be
// found in the LICENSE file.
#include "content/browser/webauth/authenticator_common.h"
#include <array>
#include <string>
#include <utility>
#include <vector>
#include "base/bind.h"
#include "base/check.h"
#include "base/command_line.h"
#include "base/metrics/histogram_macros.h"
#include "base/notreached.h"
#include "base/rand_util.h"
#include "base/strings/string_piece.h"
#include "base/strings/utf_string_conversion_utils.h"
#include "base/timer/timer.h"
#include "build/build_config.h"
#include "content/browser/bad_message.h"
#include "content/browser/webauth/authenticator_environment_impl.h"
#include "content/browser/webauth/virtual_authenticator_request_delegate.h"
#include "content/browser/webauth/virtual_fido_discovery_factory.h"
#include "content/browser/webauth/webauth_request_security_checker.h"
#include "content/public/browser/browser_context.h"
#include "content/public/browser/content_browser_client.h"
#include "content/public/browser/device_service.h"
#include "content/public/browser/is_uvpaa.h"
#include "content/public/browser/navigation_handle.h"
#include "content/public/browser/render_frame_host.h"
#include "content/public/browser/render_process_host.h"
#include "content/public/browser/render_widget_host_view.h"
#include "content/public/browser/web_contents.h"
#include "content/public/common/content_client.h"
#include "content/public/common/content_features.h"
#include "crypto/sha2.h"
#include "device/base/features.h"
#include "device/fido/attestation_statement.h"
#include "device/fido/ctap_make_credential_request.h"
#include "device/fido/features.h"
#include "device/fido/fido_authenticator.h"
#include "device/fido/fido_constants.h"
#include "device/fido/fido_parsing_utils.h"
#include "device/fido/fido_transport_protocol.h"
#include "device/fido/get_assertion_request_handler.h"
#include "device/fido/make_credential_request_handler.h"
#include "device/fido/public_key.h"
#include "device/fido/public_key_credential_descriptor.h"
#include "device/fido/public_key_credential_params.h"
#include "net/base/registry_controlled_domains/registry_controlled_domain.h"
#include "net/cert/asn1_util.h"
#include "net/der/input.h"
#include "net/der/parse_values.h"
#include "net/der/parser.h"
#include "services/network/public/cpp/is_potentially_trustworthy.h"
#include "third_party/blink/public/common/loader/network_utils.h"
#include "url/url_constants.h"
#include "url/url_util.h"
#if defined(OS_MAC)
#include "device/fido/mac/authenticator.h"
#include "device/fido/mac/credential_metadata.h"
#endif
#if defined(OS_WIN)
#include "device/fido/win/authenticator.h"
#include "device/fido/win/webauthn_api.h"
#endif
namespace content {
// RequestExtension is a type of extension in a WebAuthn request that might
// yield an extension output in the response.
enum class RequestExtension {
kAppID,
kHMACSecret,
kPRF,
kCredProps,
kLargeBlobEnable,
kLargeBlobRead,
kLargeBlobWrite,
};
namespace client_data {
const char kCreateType[] = "webauthn.create";
const char kGetType[] = "webauthn.get";
const char kU2fSignType[] = "navigator.id.getAssertion";
const char kU2fRegisterType[] = "navigator.id.finishEnrollment";
} // namespace client_data
namespace {
// AttestationPromptResult enumerates events related to attestation prompts.
// These values are recorded in an UMA histogram and so should not be
// reassigned.
enum class AttestationPromptResult {
// kQueried indicates that the embedder was queried in order to determine
// whether attestation information should be returned to the origin.
kQueried = 0,
// kTimeout indicates that a timeout occurred while awaiting the result of an
// attestation query.
kTimeout = 1,
// kAllowed indicates that the query to the embedder was resolved positively.
// (E.g. the user clicked to allow, or the embedded allowed immediately by
// policy.)
kAllowed = 2,
// kBlocked indicates that the query to the embedder was resolved negatively.
// (E.g. the user clicked to block, or closed the dialog.)
kBlocked = 3,
// kAbandoned indications that the user closed the tab or navigated away while
// the attestation prompt was showing.
kAbandoned = 4,
kMaxValue = kAbandoned,
};
// Validates whether the given origin is authorized to use the provided App
// ID value, mostly according to the rules in
// https://fidoalliance.org/specs/fido-u2f-v1.2-ps-20170411/fido-appid-and-facets-v1.2-ps-20170411.html#determining-if-a-caller-s-facetid-is-authorized-for-an-appid.
//
// Returns the App ID to use for the request, or base::nullopt if the origin
// is not authorized to use the provided value.
base::Optional<std::string> ProcessAppIdExtension(std::string appid,
const url::Origin& origin) {
// The CryptoToken U2F extension checks the appid before calling the WebAuthn
// API so there is no need to validate it here.
if (WebAuthRequestSecurityChecker::OriginIsCryptoTokenExtension(origin)) {
if (!GURL(appid).is_valid()) {
DCHECK(false) << "cryptotoken request did not set a valid App ID";
return base::nullopt;
}
return appid;
}
// Step 1: "If the AppID is not an HTTPS URL, and matches the FacetID of the
// caller, no additional processing is necessary and the operation may
// proceed."
// Webauthn is only supported on secure origins and |ValidateEffectiveDomain|
// has already checked this property of |origin| before this call. Thus this
// step is moot.
DCHECK(blink::network_utils::IsOriginSecure(origin.GetURL()));
// Step 2: "If the AppID is null or empty, the client must set the AppID to be
// the FacetID of the caller, and the operation may proceed without additional
// processing."
if (appid.empty()) {
// While the U2F spec says to default the App ID to the Facet ID, which is
// the origin plus a trailing forward slash [1], cryptotoken and Firefox
// just use the site's Origin without trailing slash. We follow their
// implementations rather than the spec.
//
// [1]https://fidoalliance.org/specs/fido-v2.0-id-20180227/fido-appid-and-facets-v2.0-id-20180227.html#determining-the-facetid-of-a-calling-application
appid = origin.Serialize();
}
// Step 3: "If the caller's FacetID is an https:// Origin sharing the same
// host as the AppID, (e.g. if an application hosted at
// https://fido.example.com/myApp set an AppID of
// https://fido.example.com/myAppId), no additional processing is necessary
// and the operation may proceed."
GURL appid_url = GURL(appid);
if (!appid_url.is_valid() || appid_url.scheme() != url::kHttpsScheme ||
appid_url.scheme_piece() != origin.scheme()) {
WebAuthRequestSecurityChecker::ReportSecurityCheckFailure(
RelyingPartySecurityCheckFailure::kAppIdExtensionInvalid);
return base::nullopt;
}
// This check is repeated inside |SameDomainOrHost|, just after this. However
// it's cheap and mirrors the structure of the spec.
if (appid_url.host_piece() == origin.host()) {
return appid;
}
// At this point we diverge from the specification in order to avoid the
// complexity of making a network request which isn't believed to be
// necessary in practice. See also
// https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1244959#c8
if (net::registry_controlled_domains::SameDomainOrHost(
appid_url, origin,
net::registry_controlled_domains::INCLUDE_PRIVATE_REGISTRIES)) {
return appid;
}
// As a compatibility hack, sites within google.com are allowed to assert two
// special-case AppIDs. Firefox also does this:
// https://groups.google.com/forum/#!msg/mozilla.dev.platform/Uiu3fwnA2xw/201ynAiPAQAJ
const GURL kGstatic1 =
GURL("https://www.gstatic.com/securitykey/origins.json");
const GURL kGstatic2 =
GURL("https://www.gstatic.com/securitykey/a/google.com/origins.json");
DCHECK(kGstatic1.is_valid() && kGstatic2.is_valid());
if (origin.DomainIs("google.com") && !appid_url.has_ref() &&
(appid_url.EqualsIgnoringRef(kGstatic1) ||
appid_url.EqualsIgnoringRef(kGstatic2))) {
return appid;
}
WebAuthRequestSecurityChecker::ReportSecurityCheckFailure(
RelyingPartySecurityCheckFailure::kAppIdExtensionDomainMismatch);
return base::nullopt;
}
// The application parameter is the SHA-256 hash of the UTF-8 encoding of
// the application identity (i.e. relying_party_id) of the application
// requesting the registration.
std::array<uint8_t, crypto::kSHA256Length> CreateApplicationParameter(
const std::string& relying_party_id) {
std::array<uint8_t, crypto::kSHA256Length> application_parameter;
crypto::SHA256HashString(relying_party_id, application_parameter.data(),
application_parameter.size());
return application_parameter;
}
device::CtapGetAssertionRequest CreateCtapGetAssertionRequest(
const std::string& client_data_json,
const blink::mojom::PublicKeyCredentialRequestOptionsPtr& options,
base::Optional<std::string> app_id,
bool is_incognito) {
device::CtapGetAssertionRequest request_parameter(options->relying_party_id,
client_data_json);
request_parameter.allow_list = options->allow_credentials;
request_parameter.user_verification = options->user_verification;
if (app_id) {
request_parameter.alternative_application_parameter =
CreateApplicationParameter(*app_id);
request_parameter.app_id = std::move(*app_id);
}
if (!options->cable_authentication_data.empty()) {
request_parameter.cable_extension = options->cable_authentication_data;
}
if (options->large_blob_read) {
request_parameter.large_blob_read = true;
request_parameter.large_blob_key = true;
}
if (options->large_blob_write) {
request_parameter.large_blob_key = true;
}
request_parameter.is_incognito_mode = is_incognito;
return request_parameter;
}
// Parses the FIDO transport types extension from the DER-encoded, X.509
// certificate in |der_cert| and appends any unique transport types found to
// |out_transports|.
void AppendUniqueTransportsFromCertificate(
base::span<const uint8_t> der_cert,
std::vector<device::FidoTransportProtocol>* out_transports) {
// See
// https://fidoalliance.org/specs/fido-u2f-v1.2-ps-20170411/fido-u2f-authenticator-transports-extension-v1.2-ps-20170411.html#fido-u2f-certificate-transports-extension
static constexpr uint8_t kTransportTypesOID[] = {
0x2b, 0x06, 0x01, 0x04, 0x01, 0x82, 0xe5, 0x1c, 0x02, 0x01, 0x01};
bool present, critical;
base::StringPiece contents;
if (!net::asn1::ExtractExtensionFromDERCert(
base::StringPiece(reinterpret_cast<const char*>(der_cert.data()),
der_cert.size()),
base::StringPiece(reinterpret_cast<const char*>(kTransportTypesOID),
sizeof(kTransportTypesOID)),
&present, &critical, &contents) ||
!present) {
return;
}
const net::der::Input contents_der(contents);
net::der::Parser contents_parser(contents_der);
net::der::BitString transport_bits;
if (!contents_parser.ReadBitString(&transport_bits)) {
return;
}
// The certificate extension contains a BIT STRING where different bits
// indicate support for different transports. The following array maps
// between these bit indexes and the FidoTransportProtocol enum.
static constexpr struct {
uint8_t bit_index;
device::FidoTransportProtocol transport;
} kTransportMapping[] = {
// Bit 0 is "Bluetooth Classic", not BLE. Since webauthn doesn't define a
// transport type for this we ignore it.
{1, device::FidoTransportProtocol::kBluetoothLowEnergy},
{2, device::FidoTransportProtocol::kUsbHumanInterfaceDevice},
{3, device::FidoTransportProtocol::kNearFieldCommunication},
{4, device::FidoTransportProtocol::kInternal},
};
for (const auto& mapping : kTransportMapping) {
if (transport_bits.AssertsBit(mapping.bit_index) &&
!base::Contains(*out_transports, mapping.transport)) {
out_transports->push_back(mapping.transport);
}
}
}
enum class AttestationErasureOption {
kIncludeAttestation,
kEraseAttestationButIncludeAaguid,
kEraseAttestationAndAaguid,
};
base::TimeDelta AdjustTimeout(base::Optional<base::TimeDelta> timeout,
RenderFrameHost* render_frame_host) {
// Time to wait for an authenticator to successfully complete an operation.
static constexpr base::TimeDelta kAdjustedTimeoutLower =
base::TimeDelta::FromSeconds(10);
static constexpr base::TimeDelta kAdjustedTimeoutUpper =
base::TimeDelta::FromMinutes(10);
if (!timeout) {
return kAdjustedTimeoutUpper;
}
const bool testing_api_enabled =
AuthenticatorEnvironmentImpl::GetInstance()
->IsVirtualAuthenticatorEnabledFor(
static_cast<RenderFrameHostImpl*>(render_frame_host)
->frame_tree_node());
if (testing_api_enabled) {
return *timeout;
}
return std::max(kAdjustedTimeoutLower,
std::min(kAdjustedTimeoutUpper, *timeout));
}
blink::mojom::MakeCredentialAuthenticatorResponsePtr
CreateMakeCredentialResponse(
const std::string& client_data_json,
device::AuthenticatorMakeCredentialResponse response_data,
AttestationErasureOption attestation_erasure,
const base::flat_set<RequestExtension>& requested_extensions) {
auto response = blink::mojom::MakeCredentialAuthenticatorResponse::New();
auto common_info = blink::mojom::CommonCredentialInfo::New();
common_info->client_data_json.assign(client_data_json.begin(),
client_data_json.end());
common_info->authenticator_data = response_data.attestation_object()
.authenticator_data()
.SerializeToByteArray();
if (response_data.android_client_data_ext()) {
DCHECK(base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(device::kWebAuthPhoneSupport));
common_info->client_data_json = *response_data.android_client_data_ext();
}
common_info->raw_id = response_data.raw_credential_id();
common_info->id = response_data.GetId();
response->info = std::move(common_info);
// The transport list must not contain duplicates but the order doesn't matter
// because Blink will sort the resulting strings before returning them.
std::vector<device::FidoTransportProtocol> transports;
if (response_data.transport_used()) {
transports.push_back(*response_data.transport_used());
}
// If the attestation certificate specifies that the token supports any other
// transports, include them in the list.
base::Optional<base::span<const uint8_t>> leaf_cert =
response_data.attestation_object()
.attestation_statement()
.GetLeafCertificate();
if (leaf_cert) {
AppendUniqueTransportsFromCertificate(*leaf_cert, &transports);
}
response->transports = std::move(transports);
bool did_create_hmac_secret = false;
const base::Optional<cbor::Value>& maybe_extensions =
response_data.attestation_object().authenticator_data().extensions();
if (maybe_extensions) {
DCHECK(maybe_extensions->is_map());
const cbor::Value::MapValue& extensions = maybe_extensions->GetMap();
const auto hmac_secret_it =
extensions.find(cbor::Value(device::kExtensionHmacSecret));
if (hmac_secret_it != extensions.end() &&
hmac_secret_it->second.is_bool() && hmac_secret_it->second.GetBool()) {
did_create_hmac_secret = true;
}
}
for (const RequestExtension ext : requested_extensions) {
switch (ext) {
case RequestExtension::kPRF:
response->echo_prf = true;
response->prf = did_create_hmac_secret;
break;
case RequestExtension::kHMACSecret:
response->echo_hmac_create_secret = true;
response->hmac_create_secret = did_create_hmac_secret;
break;
case RequestExtension::kCredProps:
response->echo_cred_props = true;
if (response_data.is_resident_key) {
response->has_cred_props_rk = true;
response->cred_props_rk = *response_data.is_resident_key;
}
break;
case RequestExtension::kLargeBlobEnable:
response->echo_large_blob = true;
response->supports_large_blob =
response_data.large_blob_key().has_value();
break;
case RequestExtension::kAppID:
case RequestExtension::kLargeBlobRead:
case RequestExtension::kLargeBlobWrite:
NOTREACHED();
break;
}
}
switch (attestation_erasure) {
case AttestationErasureOption::kIncludeAttestation:
break;
case AttestationErasureOption::kEraseAttestationButIncludeAaguid:
response_data.EraseAttestationStatement(
device::AttestationObject::AAGUID::kInclude);
break;
case AttestationErasureOption::kEraseAttestationAndAaguid:
response_data.EraseAttestationStatement(
device::AttestationObject::AAGUID::kErase);
break;
}
response->attestation_object =
response_data.GetCBOREncodedAttestationObject();
const device::PublicKey* public_key = response_data.attestation_object()
.authenticator_data()
.attested_data()
->public_key();
response->public_key_algo = public_key->algorithm;
const base::Optional<std::vector<uint8_t>>& public_key_der =
public_key->der_bytes;
if (public_key_der) {
response->public_key_der.emplace(public_key_der.value());
}
return response;
}
blink::mojom::GetAssertionAuthenticatorResponsePtr CreateGetAssertionResponse(
const std::string& client_data_json,
device::AuthenticatorGetAssertionResponse response_data,
const base::Optional<std::string>& app_id,
const base::flat_set<RequestExtension>& requested_extensions) {
auto response = blink::mojom::GetAssertionAuthenticatorResponse::New();
auto common_info = blink::mojom::CommonCredentialInfo::New();
common_info->client_data_json.assign(client_data_json.begin(),
client_data_json.end());
if (response_data.android_client_data_ext()) {
DCHECK(base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(device::kWebAuthPhoneSupport));
common_info->client_data_json = *response_data.android_client_data_ext();
}
common_info->raw_id = response_data.raw_credential_id();
common_info->id = response_data.GetId();
response->info = std::move(common_info);
response->info->authenticator_data =
response_data.auth_data().SerializeToByteArray();
response->signature = response_data.signature();
response_data.user_entity()
? response->user_handle.emplace(response_data.user_entity()->id)
: response->user_handle.emplace();
for (RequestExtension ext : requested_extensions) {
switch (ext) {
case RequestExtension::kAppID:
DCHECK(app_id);
response->echo_appid_extension = true;
if (response_data.GetRpIdHash() ==
CreateApplicationParameter(*app_id)) {
response->appid_extension = true;
}
break;
case RequestExtension::kPRF: {
response->echo_prf = true;
base::Optional<base::span<const uint8_t>> hmac_secret =
response_data.hmac_secret();
if (hmac_secret) {
auto prf_values = blink::mojom::PRFValues::New();
DCHECK(hmac_secret->size() == 32 || hmac_secret->size() == 64);
prf_values->first = device::fido_parsing_utils::Materialize(
hmac_secret->subspan(0, 32));
if (hmac_secret->size() == 64) {
prf_values->second = device::fido_parsing_utils::Materialize(
hmac_secret->subspan(32, 32));
}
response->prf_results = std::move(prf_values);
} else {
response->prf_not_evaluated =
response_data.hmac_secret_not_evaluated();
}
break;
}
case RequestExtension::kLargeBlobRead:
response->echo_large_blob = true;
response->large_blob = response_data.large_blob();
break;
case RequestExtension::kLargeBlobWrite:
response->echo_large_blob = true;
response->echo_large_blob_written = true;
response->large_blob_written = response_data.large_blob_written();
break;
case RequestExtension::kHMACSecret:
case RequestExtension::kCredProps:
case RequestExtension::kLargeBlobEnable:
NOTREACHED();
break;
}
}
return response;
}
bool IsUserVerifyingPlatformAuthenticatorAvailableImpl(
AuthenticatorRequestClientDelegate* delegate,
device::FidoDiscoveryFactory* discovery_factory,
BrowserContext* browser_context) {
if (!delegate) {
// TODO(crbug/1110081): Investigate why this can be nullptr.
NOTREACHED();
return false;
}
base::Optional<bool> is_uvpaa_override =
delegate->IsUserVerifyingPlatformAuthenticatorAvailableOverride();
if (is_uvpaa_override) {
return *is_uvpaa_override;
}
#if defined(OS_MAC)
const base::Optional<device::fido::mac::AuthenticatorConfig> config =
delegate->GetTouchIdAuthenticatorConfig();
return config && IsUVPlatformAuthenticatorAvailable(*config);
#elif defined(OS_WIN)
return !browser_context->IsOffTheRecord() &&
IsUVPlatformAuthenticatorAvailable(
discovery_factory->win_webauthn_api());
#elif defined(OS_CHROMEOS)
return !browser_context->IsOffTheRecord() &&
IsUVPlatformAuthenticatorAvailable();
#else
return false;
#endif
}
// GetAvailableTransports returns the set of transports that should be passed to
// a FidoRequestHandler for the current request. This determines for which
// transports the request handler will attempt to obtain FidoDiscovery
// instances.
base::flat_set<device::FidoTransportProtocol> GetAvailableTransports(
RenderFrameHost* render_frame_host,
AuthenticatorRequestClientDelegate* delegate,
device::FidoDiscoveryFactory* discovery_factory,
const url::Origin& caller_origin) {
// U2F requests proxied from the cryptotoken extension are limited to USB
// devices.
if (WebAuthRequestSecurityChecker::OriginIsCryptoTokenExtension(
caller_origin)) {
return base::flat_set<device::FidoTransportProtocol>(
{device::FidoTransportProtocol::kUsbHumanInterfaceDevice});
}
base::flat_set<device::FidoTransportProtocol> transports;
transports.insert(device::FidoTransportProtocol::kUsbHumanInterfaceDevice);
if (discovery_factory->IsTestOverride()) {
// The desktop implementation does not support BLE or NFC, but we emulate
// them if the testing API is enabled.
transports.insert(device::FidoTransportProtocol::kBluetoothLowEnergy);
transports.insert(device::FidoTransportProtocol::kNearFieldCommunication);
// Instantiate a virtual platform discovery regardless of IsUVPAA() to
// support non-uv, platform authenticators.
transports.insert(device::FidoTransportProtocol::kInternal);
} else {
// Don't instantiate a platform discovery in contexts where IsUVPAA() would
// return false. This avoids platform authenticators mistakenly being
// available when e.g. an embedder provided implementation of
// IsUserVerifyingPlatformAuthenticatorAvailableOverride() returned false.
if (IsUserVerifyingPlatformAuthenticatorAvailableImpl(
delegate, discovery_factory,
content::WebContents::FromRenderFrameHost(render_frame_host)
->GetBrowserContext())) {
transports.insert(device::FidoTransportProtocol::kInternal);
}
}
if (base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(features::kWebAuthCable) ||
base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(device::kWebAuthPhoneSupport)) {
transports.insert(
device::FidoTransportProtocol::kCloudAssistedBluetoothLowEnergy);
}
if (base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(device::kWebAuthPhoneSupport)) {
transports.insert(device::FidoTransportProtocol::kAndroidAccessory);
}
return transports;
}
// Returns a new FidoDiscoveryFactory for the current request. This may be
// a factory for virtual authenticators if the testing API is enabled for the
// given frame.
std::unique_ptr<device::FidoDiscoveryFactory> MakeDiscoveryFactory(
RenderFrameHost* render_frame_host,
AuthenticatorRequestClientDelegate* request_delegate,
bool is_u2f_api_request) {
VirtualAuthenticatorManagerImpl* virtual_authenticator_manager =
AuthenticatorEnvironmentImpl::GetInstance()
->MaybeGetVirtualAuthenticatorManager(
static_cast<RenderFrameHostImpl*>(render_frame_host)
->frame_tree_node());
if (virtual_authenticator_manager) {
return virtual_authenticator_manager->MakeDiscoveryFactory();
}
auto discovery_factory = std::make_unique<device::FidoDiscoveryFactory>();
#if defined(OS_MAC)
discovery_factory->set_mac_touch_id_info(
request_delegate->GetTouchIdAuthenticatorConfig());
#endif // defined(OS_MAC)
#if defined(OS_WIN)
if (base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(device::kWebAuthUseNativeWinApi)) {
discovery_factory->set_win_webauthn_api(
device::WinWebAuthnApi::GetDefault());
}
#endif // defined(OS_WIN)
#if defined(OS_CHROMEOS)
// Ignore the ChromeOS u2fd virtual U2F HID device for WebAuthn requests so
// that it doesn't collide with the ChromeOS platform authenticator, also
// implemented in u2fd.
if (base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(device::kWebAuthCrosPlatformAuthenticator) &&
!is_u2f_api_request) {
constexpr device::VidPid kChromeOsU2fdVidPid{0x18d1, 0x502c};
discovery_factory->set_hid_ignore_list({kChromeOsU2fdVidPid});
discovery_factory->set_generate_request_id_callback(
request_delegate->GetGenerateRequestIdCallback(render_frame_host));
}
#endif // defined(OS_CHROMEOS)
return discovery_factory;
}
} // namespace
AuthenticatorCommon::AuthenticatorCommon(RenderFrameHost* render_frame_host)
: render_frame_host_(render_frame_host),
security_checker_(static_cast<RenderFrameHostImpl*>(render_frame_host)
->GetWebAuthRequestSecurityChecker()) {
DCHECK(render_frame_host_);
// Disable the back-forward cache for any document that makes WebAuthn
// requests. Pages using privacy-sensitive APIs are generally exempt from
// back-forward cache for now as a precaution.
BackForwardCache::DisableForRenderFrameHost(render_frame_host,
"WebAuthenticationAPI");
}
AuthenticatorCommon::~AuthenticatorCommon() {
// This call exists to assert that |render_frame_host_| outlives this object.
// If this is violated, ASAN should notice.
render_frame_host_->GetRoutingID();
}
std::unique_ptr<AuthenticatorRequestClientDelegate>
AuthenticatorCommon::CreateRequestDelegate() {
auto* frame_tree_node =
static_cast<RenderFrameHostImpl*>(render_frame_host_)->frame_tree_node();
if (AuthenticatorEnvironmentImpl::GetInstance()
->IsVirtualAuthenticatorEnabledFor(frame_tree_node)) {
return std::make_unique<VirtualAuthenticatorRequestDelegate>(
frame_tree_node);
}
return GetContentClient()->browser()->GetWebAuthenticationRequestDelegate(
render_frame_host_);
}
void AuthenticatorCommon::StartMakeCredentialRequest(
bool allow_skipping_pin_touch) {
InitDiscoveryFactory();
request_delegate_->ConfigureCable(
caller_origin_, base::span<const device::CableDiscoveryData>(),
discovery_factory());
make_credential_options_->allow_skipping_pin_touch = allow_skipping_pin_touch;
request_ = std::make_unique<device::MakeCredentialRequestHandler>(
discovery_factory(),
GetAvailableTransports(render_frame_host_, request_delegate_.get(),
discovery_factory(), caller_origin_),
*ctap_make_credential_request_, *make_credential_options_,
base::BindOnce(&AuthenticatorCommon::OnRegisterResponse,
weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr()));
request_delegate_->RegisterActionCallbacks(
base::BindOnce(&AuthenticatorCommon::OnCancelFromUI,
weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr()) /* cancel_callback */,
base::BindRepeating(
&AuthenticatorCommon::StartMakeCredentialRequest,
weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr(),
/*allow_skipping_pin_touch=*/false) /* start_over_callback */,
base::BindRepeating(
&device::FidoRequestHandlerBase::StartAuthenticatorRequest,
request_->GetWeakPtr()) /* request_callback */,
base::BindRepeating(
&device::FidoRequestHandlerBase::PowerOnBluetoothAdapter,
request_->GetWeakPtr()) /* bluetooth_adapter_power_on_callback */);
if (make_credential_options_->resident_key !=
device::ResidentKeyRequirement::kDiscouraged) {
request_delegate_->SetMightCreateResidentCredential(true);
}
request_->set_observer(request_delegate_.get());
}
void AuthenticatorCommon::StartGetAssertionRequest(
bool allow_skipping_pin_touch) {
InitDiscoveryFactory();
base::span<const device::CableDiscoveryData> cable_pairings;
if (ctap_get_assertion_request_->cable_extension && IsFocused()) {
cable_pairings = *ctap_get_assertion_request_->cable_extension;
}
request_delegate_->ConfigureCable(caller_origin_, cable_pairings,
discovery_factory());
request_ = std::make_unique<device::GetAssertionRequestHandler>(
discovery_factory(),
GetAvailableTransports(render_frame_host_, request_delegate_.get(),
discovery_factory(), caller_origin_),
*ctap_get_assertion_request_, *ctap_get_assertion_options_,
allow_skipping_pin_touch,
base::BindOnce(&AuthenticatorCommon::OnSignResponse,
weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr()));
request_delegate_->RegisterActionCallbacks(
base::BindOnce(&AuthenticatorCommon::OnCancelFromUI,
weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr()) /* cancel_callback */,
base::BindRepeating(
&AuthenticatorCommon::StartGetAssertionRequest,
weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr(),
/*allow_skipping_pin_touch=*/false) /* start_over_callback */,
base::BindRepeating(
&device::FidoRequestHandlerBase::StartAuthenticatorRequest,
request_->GetWeakPtr()) /* request_callback */,
base::BindRepeating(
&device::FidoRequestHandlerBase::PowerOnBluetoothAdapter,
request_->GetWeakPtr()) /* bluetooth_adapter_power_on_callback */);
request_->set_observer(request_delegate_.get());
}
bool AuthenticatorCommon::IsFocused() const {
return render_frame_host_->IsCurrent() && request_delegate_->IsFocused();
}
void AuthenticatorCommon::OnLargeBlobCompressed(
data_decoder::DataDecoder::ResultOrError<mojo_base::BigBuffer> result) {
ctap_get_assertion_request_->large_blob_write =
device::fido_parsing_utils::MaterializeOrNull(result.value);
StartGetAssertionRequest(/*allow_skipping_pin_touch=*/true);
}
void AuthenticatorCommon::OnLargeBlobUncompressed(
device::AuthenticatorGetAssertionResponse response,
data_decoder::DataDecoder::ResultOrError<mojo_base::BigBuffer> result) {
response.set_large_blob(
device::fido_parsing_utils::MaterializeOrNull(result.value));
InvokeCallbackAndCleanup(
std::move(get_assertion_response_callback_),
blink::mojom::AuthenticatorStatus::SUCCESS,
CreateGetAssertionResponse(client_data_json_, std::move(response),
app_id_, requested_extensions_));
}
// static
// mojom::Authenticator
void AuthenticatorCommon::MakeCredential(
url::Origin caller_origin,
blink::mojom::PublicKeyCredentialCreationOptionsPtr options,
blink::mojom::Authenticator::MakeCredentialCallback callback) {
if (request_) {
if (WebAuthRequestSecurityChecker::OriginIsCryptoTokenExtension(
caller_origin)) {
// Requests originating from cryptotoken will generally outlive any
// navigation events on the tab of the request's sender. Evict pending
// requests if cryptotoken sends a new one such that requests from before
// a navigation event do not prevent new requests. See
// https://crbug.com/935480.
CancelWithStatus(blink::mojom::AuthenticatorStatus::NOT_ALLOWED_ERROR);
} else {
std::move(callback).Run(
blink::mojom::AuthenticatorStatus::PENDING_REQUEST, nullptr);
return;
}
}
DCHECK(!request_);
bool is_cross_origin;
blink::mojom::AuthenticatorStatus status =
security_checker_->ValidateAncestorOrigins(
caller_origin,
WebAuthRequestSecurityChecker::RequestType::kMakeCredential,
&is_cross_origin);
if (status != blink::mojom::AuthenticatorStatus::SUCCESS) {
InvokeCallbackAndCleanup(std::move(callback), status);
return;
}
request_delegate_ = CreateRequestDelegate();
if (!request_delegate_) {
InvokeCallbackAndCleanup(std::move(callback),
blink::mojom::AuthenticatorStatus::PENDING_REQUEST,
nullptr, Focus::kDontCheck);
return;
}
base::Optional<std::string> rp_id =
request_delegate_->MaybeGetRelyingPartyIdOverride(
options->relying_party.id, caller_origin);
if (!rp_id) {
// If the delegate didn't override RP ID selection then apply standard
// rules.
rp_id = std::move(options->relying_party.id);
status = security_checker_->ValidateDomainAndRelyingPartyID(caller_origin,
*rp_id);
if (status != blink::mojom::AuthenticatorStatus::SUCCESS) {
InvokeCallbackAndCleanup(std::move(callback), status, nullptr,
Focus::kDontCheck);
return;
}
}
caller_origin_ = caller_origin;
relying_party_id_ = *rp_id;
options->relying_party.id = std::move(*rp_id);
request_delegate_->SetRelyingPartyId(relying_party_id_);
base::Optional<std::string> appid_exclude;
if (options->appid_exclude) {
appid_exclude =
ProcessAppIdExtension(*options->appid_exclude, caller_origin);
if (!appid_exclude) {
InvokeCallbackAndCleanup(
std::move(callback),
blink::mojom::AuthenticatorStatus::INVALID_DOMAIN, nullptr,
Focus::kDontCheck);
return;
}
}
if (options->user.icon_url) {
status = security_checker_->ValidateAPrioriAuthenticatedUrl(
*options->user.icon_url);
}
if (status == blink::mojom::AuthenticatorStatus::SUCCESS &&
options->relying_party.icon_url) {
status = security_checker_->ValidateAPrioriAuthenticatedUrl(
*options->relying_party.icon_url);
}
if (status != blink::mojom::AuthenticatorStatus::SUCCESS) {
bad_message::ReceivedBadMessage(render_frame_host_->GetProcess(),
bad_message::AUTH_INVALID_ICON_URL);
InvokeCallbackAndCleanup(std::move(callback), status, nullptr,
Focus::kDontCheck);
return;
}
if (!IsFocused()) {
InvokeCallbackAndCleanup(std::move(callback),
blink::mojom::AuthenticatorStatus::NOT_FOCUSED);
return;
}
const device::AuthenticatorSelectionCriteria
authenticator_selection_criteria =
options->authenticator_selection
? *options->authenticator_selection
: device::AuthenticatorSelectionCriteria();
make_credential_options_ = device::MakeCredentialRequestHandler::Options(
authenticator_selection_criteria);
const bool might_create_resident_key =
make_credential_options_->resident_key !=
device::ResidentKeyRequirement::kDiscouraged;
if (might_create_resident_key && !request_delegate_->SupportsResidentKeys()) {
if (make_credential_options_->resident_key ==
device::ResidentKeyRequirement::kRequired) {
InvokeCallbackAndCleanup(
std::move(callback),
blink::mojom::AuthenticatorStatus::RESIDENT_CREDENTIALS_UNSUPPORTED);
return;
}
// Downgrade 'preferred' to 'discouraged'.
make_credential_options_->resident_key =
device::ResidentKeyRequirement::kDiscouraged;
}
// Reject any non-sensical credProtect extension values.
if ( // Can't require the default policy (or no policy).
(options->enforce_protection_policy &&
(options->protection_policy ==
blink::mojom::ProtectionPolicy::UNSPECIFIED ||
options->protection_policy == blink::mojom::ProtectionPolicy::NONE)) ||
// For non-resident keys, NONE doesn't make sense. (UV_OR_CRED_ID_REQUIRED
// does because, with CTAP 2.0, just because a resident key isn't
// _required_ doesn't mean that one won't be created and an RP might want
// credProtect to take effect if that happens.)
(!might_create_resident_key &&
options->protection_policy == blink::mojom::ProtectionPolicy::NONE) ||
// UV_REQUIRED only makes sense if UV is required overall.
(options->protection_policy ==
blink::mojom::ProtectionPolicy::UV_REQUIRED &&
authenticator_selection_criteria.user_verification_requirement() !=
device::UserVerificationRequirement::kRequired)) {
InvokeCallbackAndCleanup(
std::move(callback),
blink::mojom::AuthenticatorStatus::PROTECTION_POLICY_INCONSISTENT);
return;
}
base::Optional<device::CredProtectRequest> cred_protect_request;
switch (options->protection_policy) {
case blink::mojom::ProtectionPolicy::UNSPECIFIED:
if (might_create_resident_key) {
// If not specified, kUVOrCredIDRequired is made the default unless
// the authenticator defaults to something better.
cred_protect_request =
device::CredProtectRequest::kUVOrCredIDRequiredOrBetter;
}
break;
case blink::mojom::ProtectionPolicy::NONE:
cred_protect_request = device::CredProtectRequest::kUVOptional;
break;
case blink::mojom::ProtectionPolicy::UV_OR_CRED_ID_REQUIRED:
cred_protect_request = device::CredProtectRequest::kUVOrCredIDRequired;
break;
case blink::mojom::ProtectionPolicy::UV_REQUIRED:
cred_protect_request = device::CredProtectRequest::kUVRequired;
break;
}
if (cred_protect_request) {
make_credential_options_->cred_protect_request = {
{*cred_protect_request, options->enforce_protection_policy}};
}
DCHECK(make_credential_response_callback_.is_null());
make_credential_response_callback_ = std::move(callback);
timer_->Start(
FROM_HERE, AdjustTimeout(options->timeout, render_frame_host_),
base::BindOnce(&AuthenticatorCommon::OnTimeout, base::Unretained(this)));
const bool origin_is_crypto_token_extension =
WebAuthRequestSecurityChecker::OriginIsCryptoTokenExtension(
caller_origin_);
// Cryptotoken provides the sender origin for register requests in the
// |relying_party| |name| attribute. (The |id| attribute contains the AppID.)
client_data_json_ =
origin_is_crypto_token_extension
? device::SerializeCollectedClientDataToJson(
client_data::kU2fRegisterType, *options->relying_party.name,
options->challenge, /*is_cross_origin=*/false,
/*use_legacy_u2f_type_key=*/true)
: device::SerializeCollectedClientDataToJson(
client_data::kCreateType, caller_origin_.Serialize(),
options->challenge, is_cross_origin);
// Cryptotoken requests should be proxied without UI.
if (origin_is_crypto_token_extension || disable_ui_)
request_delegate_->DisableUI();
UMA_HISTOGRAM_COUNTS_100(
"WebAuthentication.MakeCredentialExcludeCredentialsCount",
options->exclude_credentials.size());
ctap_make_credential_request_ = device::CtapMakeCredentialRequest(
client_data_json_, options->relying_party, options->user,
device::PublicKeyCredentialParams(options->public_key_parameters));
ctap_make_credential_request_->exclude_list = options->exclude_credentials;
if (options->prf_enable) {
requested_extensions_.insert(RequestExtension::kPRF);
ctap_make_credential_request_->hmac_secret = true;
}
if (options->hmac_create_secret) {
requested_extensions_.insert(RequestExtension::kHMACSecret);
ctap_make_credential_request_->hmac_secret = true;
}
if (options->cred_props) {
requested_extensions_.insert(RequestExtension::kCredProps);
}
if (options->large_blob_enable != device::LargeBlobSupport::kNotRequested) {
requested_extensions_.insert(RequestExtension::kLargeBlobEnable);