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canonical_cookie.cc
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// Copyright (c) 2012 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be
// found in the LICENSE file.
// Portions of this code based on Mozilla:
// (netwerk/cookie/src/nsCookieService.cpp)
/* ***** BEGIN LICENSE BLOCK *****
* Version: MPL 1.1/GPL 2.0/LGPL 2.1
*
* The contents of this file are subject to the Mozilla Public License Version
* 1.1 (the "License"); you may not use this file except in compliance with
* the License. You may obtain a copy of the License at
* http://www.mozilla.org/MPL/
*
* Software distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" basis,
* WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. See the License
* for the specific language governing rights and limitations under the
* License.
*
* The Original Code is mozilla.org code.
*
* The Initial Developer of the Original Code is
* Netscape Communications Corporation.
* Portions created by the Initial Developer are Copyright (C) 2003
* the Initial Developer. All Rights Reserved.
*
* Contributor(s):
* Daniel Witte (dwitte@stanford.edu)
* Michiel van Leeuwen (mvl@exedo.nl)
*
* Alternatively, the contents of this file may be used under the terms of
* either the GNU General Public License Version 2 or later (the "GPL"), or
* the GNU Lesser General Public License Version 2.1 or later (the "LGPL"),
* in which case the provisions of the GPL or the LGPL are applicable instead
* of those above. If you wish to allow use of your version of this file only
* under the terms of either the GPL or the LGPL, and not to allow others to
* use your version of this file under the terms of the MPL, indicate your
* decision by deleting the provisions above and replace them with the notice
* and other provisions required by the GPL or the LGPL. If you do not delete
* the provisions above, a recipient may use your version of this file under
* the terms of any one of the MPL, the GPL or the LGPL.
*
* ***** END LICENSE BLOCK ***** */
#include "net/cookies/canonical_cookie.h"
#include <limits>
#include <sstream>
#include <utility>
#include "base/containers/contains.h"
#include "base/feature_list.h"
#include "base/format_macros.h"
#include "base/logging.h"
#include "base/memory/ptr_util.h"
#include "base/metrics/histogram_functions.h"
#include "base/metrics/histogram_macros.h"
#include "base/strings/strcat.h"
#include "base/strings/string_number_conversions.h"
#include "base/strings/string_util.h"
#include "base/strings/stringprintf.h"
#include "net/base/features.h"
#include "net/base/url_util.h"
#include "net/cookies/cookie_constants.h"
#include "net/cookies/cookie_inclusion_status.h"
#include "net/cookies/cookie_options.h"
#include "net/cookies/cookie_util.h"
#include "net/cookies/parsed_cookie.h"
#include "url/gurl.h"
#include "url/url_canon.h"
#include "url/url_util.h"
using base::Time;
using base::TimeDelta;
namespace net {
namespace {
// Determine the cookie domain to use for setting the specified cookie.
bool GetCookieDomain(const GURL& url,
const ParsedCookie& pc,
std::string* result) {
std::string domain_string;
if (pc.HasDomain())
domain_string = pc.Domain();
return cookie_util::GetCookieDomainWithString(url, domain_string, result);
}
// Compares cookies using name, domain and path, so that "equivalent" cookies
// (per RFC 2965) are equal to each other.
int PartialCookieOrdering(const CanonicalCookie& a, const CanonicalCookie& b) {
int diff = a.Name().compare(b.Name());
if (diff != 0)
return diff;
diff = a.Domain().compare(b.Domain());
if (diff != 0)
return diff;
return a.Path().compare(b.Path());
}
void AppendCookieLineEntry(const CanonicalCookie& cookie,
std::string* cookie_line) {
if (!cookie_line->empty())
*cookie_line += "; ";
// In Mozilla, if you set a cookie like "AAA", it will have an empty token
// and a value of "AAA". When it sends the cookie back, it will send "AAA",
// so we need to avoid sending "=AAA" for a blank token value.
if (!cookie.Name().empty())
*cookie_line += cookie.Name() + "=";
*cookie_line += cookie.Value();
}
// Captures Strict -> Lax context downgrade with Strict cookie
bool IsBreakingStrictToLaxDowngrade(
CookieOptions::SameSiteCookieContext::ContextType context,
CookieOptions::SameSiteCookieContext::ContextType schemeful_context,
CookieEffectiveSameSite effective_same_site,
bool is_cookie_being_set) {
if (context ==
CookieOptions::SameSiteCookieContext::ContextType::SAME_SITE_STRICT &&
schemeful_context ==
CookieOptions::SameSiteCookieContext::ContextType::SAME_SITE_LAX &&
effective_same_site == CookieEffectiveSameSite::STRICT_MODE) {
// This downgrade only applies when a SameSite=Strict cookie is being sent.
// A Strict -> Lax downgrade will not affect a Strict cookie which is being
// set because it will be set in either context.
return !is_cookie_being_set;
}
return false;
}
// Captures Strict -> Cross-site context downgrade with {Strict, Lax} cookie
// Captures Strict -> Lax Unsafe context downgrade with {Strict, Lax} cookie.
// This is treated as a cross-site downgrade due to the Lax Unsafe context
// behaving like cross-site.
bool IsBreakingStrictToCrossDowngrade(
CookieOptions::SameSiteCookieContext::ContextType context,
CookieOptions::SameSiteCookieContext::ContextType schemeful_context,
CookieEffectiveSameSite effective_same_site) {
bool breaking_schemeful_context =
schemeful_context ==
CookieOptions::SameSiteCookieContext::ContextType::CROSS_SITE ||
schemeful_context == CookieOptions::SameSiteCookieContext::ContextType::
SAME_SITE_LAX_METHOD_UNSAFE;
bool strict_lax_enforcement =
effective_same_site == CookieEffectiveSameSite::STRICT_MODE ||
effective_same_site == CookieEffectiveSameSite::LAX_MODE ||
// Treat LAX_MODE_ALLOW_UNSAFE the same as LAX_MODE for the purposes of
// our SameSite enforcement check.
effective_same_site == CookieEffectiveSameSite::LAX_MODE_ALLOW_UNSAFE;
if (context ==
CookieOptions::SameSiteCookieContext::ContextType::SAME_SITE_STRICT &&
breaking_schemeful_context && strict_lax_enforcement) {
return true;
}
return false;
}
// Captures Lax -> Cross context downgrade with {Strict, Lax} cookies.
// Ignores Lax Unsafe context.
bool IsBreakingLaxToCrossDowngrade(
CookieOptions::SameSiteCookieContext::ContextType context,
CookieOptions::SameSiteCookieContext::ContextType schemeful_context,
CookieEffectiveSameSite effective_same_site,
bool is_cookie_being_set) {
bool lax_enforcement =
effective_same_site == CookieEffectiveSameSite::LAX_MODE ||
// Treat LAX_MODE_ALLOW_UNSAFE the same as LAX_MODE for the purposes of
// our SameSite enforcement check.
effective_same_site == CookieEffectiveSameSite::LAX_MODE_ALLOW_UNSAFE;
if (context ==
CookieOptions::SameSiteCookieContext::ContextType::SAME_SITE_LAX &&
schemeful_context ==
CookieOptions::SameSiteCookieContext::ContextType::CROSS_SITE) {
// For SameSite=Strict cookies this downgrade only applies when it is being
// set. A Lax -> Cross downgrade will not affect a Strict cookie which is
// being sent because it wouldn't be sent in either context.
return effective_same_site == CookieEffectiveSameSite::STRICT_MODE
? is_cookie_being_set
: lax_enforcement;
}
return false;
}
void ApplySameSiteCookieWarningToStatus(
CookieSameSite samesite,
CookieEffectiveSameSite effective_samesite,
bool is_secure,
const CookieOptions::SameSiteCookieContext& same_site_context,
CookieInclusionStatus* status,
bool is_cookie_being_set) {
if (samesite == CookieSameSite::UNSPECIFIED &&
same_site_context.GetContextForCookieInclusion() <
CookieOptions::SameSiteCookieContext::ContextType::SAME_SITE_LAX) {
status->AddWarningReason(
CookieInclusionStatus::WARN_SAMESITE_UNSPECIFIED_CROSS_SITE_CONTEXT);
}
if (effective_samesite == CookieEffectiveSameSite::LAX_MODE_ALLOW_UNSAFE &&
same_site_context.GetContextForCookieInclusion() ==
CookieOptions::SameSiteCookieContext::ContextType::
SAME_SITE_LAX_METHOD_UNSAFE) {
// This warning is more specific so remove the previous, more general,
// warning.
status->RemoveWarningReason(
CookieInclusionStatus::WARN_SAMESITE_UNSPECIFIED_CROSS_SITE_CONTEXT);
status->AddWarningReason(
CookieInclusionStatus::WARN_SAMESITE_UNSPECIFIED_LAX_ALLOW_UNSAFE);
}
if (samesite == CookieSameSite::NO_RESTRICTION && !is_secure) {
status->AddWarningReason(
CookieInclusionStatus::WARN_SAMESITE_NONE_INSECURE);
}
// Add a warning if the cookie would be accessible in
// |same_site_context|::context but not in
// |same_site_context|::schemeful_context.
if (IsBreakingStrictToLaxDowngrade(same_site_context.context(),
same_site_context.schemeful_context(),
effective_samesite, is_cookie_being_set)) {
status->AddWarningReason(
CookieInclusionStatus::WARN_STRICT_LAX_DOWNGRADE_STRICT_SAMESITE);
} else if (IsBreakingStrictToCrossDowngrade(
same_site_context.context(),
same_site_context.schemeful_context(), effective_samesite)) {
// Which warning to apply depends on the SameSite value.
if (effective_samesite == CookieEffectiveSameSite::STRICT_MODE) {
status->AddWarningReason(
CookieInclusionStatus::WARN_STRICT_CROSS_DOWNGRADE_STRICT_SAMESITE);
} else {
// LAX_MODE or LAX_MODE_ALLOW_UNSAFE.
status->AddWarningReason(
CookieInclusionStatus::WARN_STRICT_CROSS_DOWNGRADE_LAX_SAMESITE);
}
} else if (IsBreakingLaxToCrossDowngrade(
same_site_context.context(),
same_site_context.schemeful_context(), effective_samesite,
is_cookie_being_set)) {
// Which warning to apply depends on the SameSite value.
if (effective_samesite == CookieEffectiveSameSite::STRICT_MODE) {
status->AddWarningReason(
CookieInclusionStatus::WARN_LAX_CROSS_DOWNGRADE_STRICT_SAMESITE);
} else {
// LAX_MODE or LAX_MODE_ALLOW_UNSAFE.
// This warning applies to both set/send.
status->AddWarningReason(
CookieInclusionStatus::WARN_LAX_CROSS_DOWNGRADE_LAX_SAMESITE);
}
}
// Apply warning for whether inclusion was changed by considering redirects
// for the SameSite context calculation. This does not look at the actual
// inclusion or exclusion, but only at whether the inclusion differs between
// considering redirects and not.
using ContextDowngradeType = CookieOptions::SameSiteCookieContext::
ContextMetadata::ContextDowngradeType;
const auto& metadata = same_site_context.GetMetadataForCurrentSchemefulMode();
bool apply_cross_site_redirect_downgrade_warning = false;
switch (effective_samesite) {
case CookieEffectiveSameSite::STRICT_MODE:
// Strict contexts are all normalized to lax for cookie writes, so a
// strict-to-{lax,cross} downgrade cannot occur for response cookies.
apply_cross_site_redirect_downgrade_warning =
is_cookie_being_set ? metadata.cross_site_redirect_downgrade ==
ContextDowngradeType::kLaxToCross
: (metadata.cross_site_redirect_downgrade ==
ContextDowngradeType::kStrictToLax ||
metadata.cross_site_redirect_downgrade ==
ContextDowngradeType::kStrictToCross);
break;
case CookieEffectiveSameSite::LAX_MODE:
case CookieEffectiveSameSite::LAX_MODE_ALLOW_UNSAFE:
// Note that a lax-to-cross downgrade can only happen for response
// cookies, because a laxly same-site context only happens for a safe
// top-level cross-site request, which cannot be downgraded due to a
// cross-site redirect to a non-top-level or unsafe cross-site request.
apply_cross_site_redirect_downgrade_warning =
metadata.cross_site_redirect_downgrade ==
(is_cookie_being_set ? ContextDowngradeType::kLaxToCross
: ContextDowngradeType::kStrictToCross);
break;
default:
break;
}
if (apply_cross_site_redirect_downgrade_warning) {
status->AddWarningReason(
CookieInclusionStatus::
WARN_CROSS_SITE_REDIRECT_DOWNGRADE_CHANGES_INCLUSION);
}
// If there are reasons to exclude the cookie other than SameSite, don't warn
// about the cookie at all.
status->MaybeClearSameSiteWarning();
}
// These values are persisted to logs. Entries should not be renumbered and
// numeric values should never be reused.
enum class SameSiteNonePartyContextType {
// SameSite=None was required in order for the cookie to be included.
kSameSiteNoneRequired = 0,
// The cookie would have been included if it were SameParty (using only the
// top frame and resource URL).
kSamePartyTopResource = 1,
// The cookie would have been included if it were SameParty (using the
// resource URL and all frame ancestors).
kSamePartyAncestors = 2,
// The cookie would have been included if it were SameSite=Lax.
kSameSiteLax = 3,
// The cookie would have been included if it were SameSite=Strict.
kSameSiteStrict = 4,
kMaxValue = kSameSiteStrict
};
void RecordSameSiteNoneReadContextMetric(SameSiteNonePartyContextType type) {
UMA_HISTOGRAM_ENUMERATION("Cookie.SameSiteNone.PartyContext.Read", type);
}
void RecordSameSiteNoneWriteContextMetric(SameSiteNonePartyContextType type) {
UMA_HISTOGRAM_ENUMERATION("Cookie.SameSiteNone.PartyContext.Write", type);
}
} // namespace
CookieAccessParams::CookieAccessParams(CookieAccessSemantics access_semantics,
bool delegate_treats_url_as_trustworthy,
CookieSamePartyStatus same_party_status)
: access_semantics(access_semantics),
delegate_treats_url_as_trustworthy(delegate_treats_url_as_trustworthy),
same_party_status(same_party_status) {}
CanonicalCookie::CanonicalCookie() = default;
CanonicalCookie::CanonicalCookie(const CanonicalCookie& other) = default;
CanonicalCookie::CanonicalCookie(CanonicalCookie&& other) = default;
CanonicalCookie& CanonicalCookie::operator=(const CanonicalCookie& other) =
default;
CanonicalCookie& CanonicalCookie::operator=(CanonicalCookie&& other) = default;
CanonicalCookie::CanonicalCookie(
std::string name,
std::string value,
std::string domain,
std::string path,
base::Time creation,
base::Time expiration,
base::Time last_access,
bool secure,
bool httponly,
CookieSameSite same_site,
CookiePriority priority,
bool same_party,
absl::optional<CookiePartitionKey> partition_key,
CookieSourceScheme source_scheme,
int source_port)
: name_(std::move(name)),
value_(std::move(value)),
domain_(std::move(domain)),
path_(std::move(path)),
creation_date_(creation),
expiry_date_(expiration),
last_access_date_(last_access),
secure_(secure),
httponly_(httponly),
same_site_(same_site),
priority_(priority),
same_party_(same_party),
partition_key_(std::move(partition_key)),
source_scheme_(source_scheme) {
SetSourcePort(source_port);
}
CanonicalCookie::~CanonicalCookie() = default;
// static
std::string CanonicalCookie::CanonPathWithString(
const GURL& url,
const std::string& path_string) {
// The path was supplied in the cookie, we'll take it.
if (!path_string.empty() && path_string[0] == '/')
return path_string;
// The path was not supplied in the cookie or invalid, we will default
// to the current URL path.
// """Defaults to the path of the request URL that generated the
// Set-Cookie response, up to, but not including, the
// right-most /."""
// How would this work for a cookie on /? We will include it then.
const std::string& url_path = url.path();
size_t idx = url_path.find_last_of('/');
// The cookie path was invalid or a single '/'.
if (idx == 0 || idx == std::string::npos)
return std::string("/");
// Return up to the rightmost '/'.
return url_path.substr(0, idx);
}
// static
Time CanonicalCookie::CanonExpiration(const ParsedCookie& pc,
const Time& current,
const Time& server_time) {
// First, try the Max-Age attribute.
if (pc.HasMaxAge()) {
int64_t max_age = 0;
// Use the output if StringToInt64 returns true ("perfect" conversion). This
// case excludes overflow/underflow, leading/trailing whitespace, non-number
// strings, and empty string. (ParsedCookie trims whitespace.)
if (base::StringToInt64(pc.MaxAge(), &max_age)) {
// RFC 6265bis algorithm for parsing Max-Age:
// "If delta-seconds is less than or equal to zero (0), let expiry-
// time be the earliest representable date and time. ... "
if (max_age <= 0)
return Time::Min();
// "... Otherwise, let the expiry-time be the current date and time plus
// delta-seconds seconds."
return current + TimeDelta::FromSeconds(max_age);
} else {
// If the conversion wasn't perfect, but the best-effort conversion
// resulted in an overflow/underflow, use the min/max representable time.
// (This is alluded to in the spec, which says the user agent MAY clip an
// Expires attribute to a saturated time. We'll do the same for Max-Age.)
if (max_age == std::numeric_limits<int64_t>::min())
return Time::Min();
if (max_age == std::numeric_limits<int64_t>::max())
return Time::Max();
}
}
// Try the Expires attribute.
if (pc.HasExpires() && !pc.Expires().empty()) {
// Adjust for clock skew between server and host.
base::Time parsed_expiry =
cookie_util::ParseCookieExpirationTime(pc.Expires());
if (!parsed_expiry.is_null())
return parsed_expiry + (current - server_time);
}
// Invalid or no expiration, session cookie.
return Time();
}
// static
std::unique_ptr<CanonicalCookie> CanonicalCookie::Create(
const GURL& url,
const std::string& cookie_line,
const base::Time& creation_time,
absl::optional<base::Time> server_time,
absl::optional<CookiePartitionKey> cookie_partition_key,
CookieInclusionStatus* status) {
// Put a pointer on the stack so the rest of the function can assign to it if
// the default nullptr is passed in.
CookieInclusionStatus blank_status;
if (status == nullptr) {
status = &blank_status;
}
*status = CookieInclusionStatus();
ParsedCookie parsed_cookie(cookie_line, status);
if (!parsed_cookie.IsValid()) {
DVLOG(net::cookie_util::kVlogSetCookies)
<< "WARNING: Couldn't parse cookie";
// TODO(crbug.com/1228815): Apply more specific exclusion reasons.
DCHECK(status->HasExclusionReason(
CookieInclusionStatus::EXCLUDE_FAILURE_TO_STORE));
// Don't continue, because an invalid ParsedCookie doesn't have any
// attributes.
// TODO(chlily): Log metrics.
return nullptr;
}
std::string cookie_domain;
if (!GetCookieDomain(url, parsed_cookie, &cookie_domain)) {
DVLOG(net::cookie_util::kVlogSetCookies)
<< "Create() failed to get a valid cookie domain";
status->AddExclusionReason(CookieInclusionStatus::EXCLUDE_INVALID_DOMAIN);
}
std::string cookie_path = CanonPathWithString(
url, parsed_cookie.HasPath() ? parsed_cookie.Path() : std::string());
Time cookie_server_time(creation_time);
if (server_time.has_value() && !server_time->is_null())
cookie_server_time = server_time.value();
DCHECK(!creation_time.is_null());
Time cookie_expires = CanonicalCookie::CanonExpiration(
parsed_cookie, creation_time, cookie_server_time);
CookiePrefix prefix = GetCookiePrefix(parsed_cookie.Name());
bool is_cookie_prefix_valid = IsCookiePrefixValid(prefix, url, parsed_cookie);
RecordCookiePrefixMetrics(prefix, is_cookie_prefix_valid);
if (!is_cookie_prefix_valid) {
DVLOG(net::cookie_util::kVlogSetCookies)
<< "Create() failed because the cookie violated prefix rules.";
status->AddExclusionReason(CookieInclusionStatus::EXCLUDE_INVALID_PREFIX);
}
bool is_same_party_valid = IsCookieSamePartyValid(parsed_cookie);
if (!is_same_party_valid) {
status->AddExclusionReason(
CookieInclusionStatus::EXCLUDE_INVALID_SAMEPARTY);
}
// Collect metrics on whether usage of SameParty attribute is correct.
if (parsed_cookie.IsSameParty())
base::UmaHistogramBoolean("Cookie.IsSamePartyValid", is_same_party_valid);
bool is_partitioned_valid = IsCookiePartitionedValid(parsed_cookie);
if (!is_partitioned_valid) {
status->AddExclusionReason(
CookieInclusionStatus::EXCLUDE_INVALID_PARTITIONED);
}
// Collect metrics on whether usage of the Partitioned attribute is correct.
if (parsed_cookie.IsPartitioned()) {
base::UmaHistogramBoolean("Cookie.IsPartitionedValid",
is_partitioned_valid);
} else {
cookie_partition_key = absl::nullopt;
}
if (!status->IsInclude())
return nullptr;
CookieSameSiteString samesite_string = CookieSameSiteString::kUnspecified;
CookieSameSite samesite = parsed_cookie.SameSite(&samesite_string);
CookieSourceScheme source_scheme = url.SchemeIsCryptographic()
? CookieSourceScheme::kSecure
: CookieSourceScheme::kNonSecure;
// Get the port, this will get a default value if a port isn't provided.
int source_port = url.EffectiveIntPort();
// TODO(crbug.com/987177) Add partition key if Partitioned is present in the
// cookie line.
std::unique_ptr<CanonicalCookie> cc = base::WrapUnique(new CanonicalCookie(
parsed_cookie.Name(), parsed_cookie.Value(), cookie_domain, cookie_path,
creation_time, cookie_expires, creation_time, parsed_cookie.IsSecure(),
parsed_cookie.IsHttpOnly(), samesite, parsed_cookie.Priority(),
parsed_cookie.IsSameParty(), cookie_partition_key, source_scheme,
source_port));
// TODO(chlily): Log metrics.
if (!cc->IsCanonical()) {
status->AddExclusionReason(
net::CookieInclusionStatus::EXCLUDE_FAILURE_TO_STORE);
return nullptr;
}
RecordCookieSameSiteAttributeValueHistogram(samesite_string,
parsed_cookie.IsSameParty());
UMA_HISTOGRAM_BOOLEAN("Cookie.ControlCharacterTruncation",
parsed_cookie.HasTruncatedNameOrValue());
return cc;
}
// static
std::unique_ptr<CanonicalCookie> CanonicalCookie::CreateSanitizedCookie(
const GURL& url,
const std::string& name,
const std::string& value,
const std::string& domain,
const std::string& path,
base::Time creation_time,
base::Time expiration_time,
base::Time last_access_time,
bool secure,
bool http_only,
CookieSameSite same_site,
CookiePriority priority,
bool same_party,
absl::optional<CookiePartitionKey> partition_key,
CookieInclusionStatus* status) {
// Put a pointer on the stack so the rest of the function can assign to it if
// the default nullptr is passed in.
CookieInclusionStatus blank_status;
if (status == nullptr) {
status = &blank_status;
}
*status = CookieInclusionStatus();
// Validate consistency of passed arguments.
if (ParsedCookie::ParseTokenString(name) != name) {
status->AddExclusionReason(
net::CookieInclusionStatus::EXCLUDE_FAILURE_TO_STORE);
} else if (ParsedCookie::ParseValueString(value) != value) {
status->AddExclusionReason(
net::CookieInclusionStatus::EXCLUDE_FAILURE_TO_STORE);
} else if (ParsedCookie::ParseValueString(path) != path) {
// NOTE: If `path` contains "terminating characters" ('\r', '\n', and
// '\0'), ';', or leading / trailing whitespace, path will be rejected,
// but any other control characters will just get URL-encoded below.
status->AddExclusionReason(
net::CookieInclusionStatus::EXCLUDE_FAILURE_TO_STORE);
}
if (base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(features::kExtraCookieValidityChecks)) {
// Validate name and value against character set and size limit constraints.
// If IsValidCookieNameValuePair identifies that `name` and/or `value` are
// invalid, it will add an ExclusionReason to `status`.
ParsedCookie::IsValidCookieNameValuePair(name, value, status);
} else if (!ParsedCookie::IsValidCookieAttributeValueLegacy(name) ||
!ParsedCookie::IsValidCookieAttributeValueLegacy(value) ||
(name.empty() && value.empty())) {
status->AddExclusionReason(
net::CookieInclusionStatus::EXCLUDE_FAILURE_TO_STORE);
}
// Validate domain against character set and size limit constraints.
bool domain_is_valid = true;
if ((ParsedCookie::ParseValueString(domain) != domain)) {
status->AddExclusionReason(
net::CookieInclusionStatus::EXCLUDE_INVALID_DOMAIN);
domain_is_valid = false;
}
if (base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(features::kExtraCookieValidityChecks)) {
if (!ParsedCookie::CookieAttributeValueHasValidCharSet(domain) ||
!ParsedCookie::CookieAttributeValueHasValidSize(domain)) {
status->AddExclusionReason(
net::CookieInclusionStatus::EXCLUDE_INVALID_DOMAIN);
domain_is_valid = false;
}
}
const std::string& domain_attribute =
domain_is_valid ? domain : std::string();
std::string cookie_domain;
// This validation step must happen before GetCookieDomainWithString, so it
// doesn't fail DCHECKs.
if (!cookie_util::DomainIsHostOnly(url.host())) {
status->AddExclusionReason(
net::CookieInclusionStatus::EXCLUDE_INVALID_DOMAIN);
} else if (!cookie_util::GetCookieDomainWithString(url, domain_attribute,
&cookie_domain)) {
status->AddExclusionReason(
net::CookieInclusionStatus::EXCLUDE_INVALID_DOMAIN);
}
CookieSourceScheme source_scheme = CookieSourceScheme::kNonSecure;
// This validation step must happen before SchemeIsCryptographic, so it
// doesn't fail DCHECKs.
if (!url.is_valid()) {
status->AddExclusionReason(
net::CookieInclusionStatus::EXCLUDE_INVALID_DOMAIN);
} else {
source_scheme = url.SchemeIsCryptographic()
? CookieSourceScheme::kSecure
: CookieSourceScheme::kNonSecure;
}
// Get the port, this will get a default value if a port isn't provided.
int source_port = url.EffectiveIntPort();
std::string cookie_path = CanonicalCookie::CanonPathWithString(url, path);
// Canonicalize path again to make sure it escapes characters as needed.
url::Component path_component(0, cookie_path.length());
url::RawCanonOutputT<char> canon_path;
url::Component canon_path_component;
url::CanonicalizePath(cookie_path.data(), path_component, &canon_path,
&canon_path_component);
std::string encoded_cookie_path = std::string(
canon_path.data() + canon_path_component.begin, canon_path_component.len);
if (!path.empty()) {
if (cookie_path != path) {
// The path attribute was specified and found to be invalid, so record an
// error.
status->AddExclusionReason(
net::CookieInclusionStatus::EXCLUDE_FAILURE_TO_STORE);
} else if (base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(
features::kExtraCookieValidityChecks) &&
!ParsedCookie::CookieAttributeValueHasValidSize(
encoded_cookie_path)) {
// The path attribute was specified and encodes into a value that's longer
// than the length limit, so record an error.
status->AddExclusionReason(
net::CookieInclusionStatus::EXCLUDE_FAILURE_TO_STORE);
}
}
CookiePrefix prefix = GetCookiePrefix(name);
if (!IsCookiePrefixValid(prefix, url, secure, domain_attribute,
cookie_path)) {
status->AddExclusionReason(
net::CookieInclusionStatus::EXCLUDE_INVALID_PREFIX);
}
if (!IsCookieSamePartyValid(same_party, secure, same_site)) {
status->AddExclusionReason(
net::CookieInclusionStatus::EXCLUDE_INVALID_SAMEPARTY);
}
if (!IsCookiePartitionedValid(partition_key.has_value(), prefix,
same_party)) {
status->AddExclusionReason(
net::CookieInclusionStatus::EXCLUDE_INVALID_PARTITIONED);
}
if (!last_access_time.is_null() && creation_time.is_null()) {
status->AddExclusionReason(
net::CookieInclusionStatus::EXCLUDE_FAILURE_TO_STORE);
}
if (!status->IsInclude())
return nullptr;
std::unique_ptr<CanonicalCookie> cc = base::WrapUnique(new CanonicalCookie(
name, value, cookie_domain, encoded_cookie_path, creation_time,
expiration_time, last_access_time, secure, http_only, same_site, priority,
same_party, partition_key, source_scheme, source_port));
DCHECK(cc->IsCanonical());
return cc;
}
// static
std::unique_ptr<CanonicalCookie> CanonicalCookie::FromStorage(
std::string name,
std::string value,
std::string domain,
std::string path,
base::Time creation,
base::Time expiration,
base::Time last_access,
bool secure,
bool httponly,
CookieSameSite same_site,
CookiePriority priority,
bool same_party,
absl::optional<CookiePartitionKey> partition_key,
CookieSourceScheme source_scheme,
int source_port) {
std::unique_ptr<CanonicalCookie> cc = base::WrapUnique(new CanonicalCookie(
std::move(name), std::move(value), std::move(domain), std::move(path),
creation, expiration, last_access, secure, httponly, same_site, priority,
same_party, partition_key, source_scheme, source_port));
if (!cc->IsCanonical())
return nullptr;
return cc;
}
// static
std::unique_ptr<CanonicalCookie> CanonicalCookie::CreateUnsafeCookieForTesting(
const std::string& name,
const std::string& value,
const std::string& domain,
const std::string& path,
const base::Time& creation,
const base::Time& expiration,
const base::Time& last_access,
bool secure,
bool httponly,
CookieSameSite same_site,
CookiePriority priority,
bool same_party,
absl::optional<CookiePartitionKey> partition_key,
CookieSourceScheme source_scheme,
int source_port) {
return base::WrapUnique(new CanonicalCookie(
name, value, domain, path, creation, expiration, last_access, secure,
httponly, same_site, priority, same_party, partition_key, source_scheme,
source_port));
}
std::string CanonicalCookie::DomainWithoutDot() const {
return cookie_util::CookieDomainAsHost(domain_);
}
void CanonicalCookie::SetSourcePort(int port) {
if ((port >= 0 && port <= 65535) || port == url::PORT_UNSPECIFIED) {
// 0 would be really weird as it has a special meaning, but it's still
// technically a valid tcp/ip port so we're going to accept it here.
source_port_ = port;
} else {
source_port_ = url::PORT_INVALID;
}
}
bool CanonicalCookie::IsEquivalentForSecureCookieMatching(
const CanonicalCookie& secure_cookie) const {
bool same_partition_key =
!base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(features::kPartitionedCookies) ||
PartitionKey() == secure_cookie.PartitionKey();
// Names must be the same
bool same_name = name_ == secure_cookie.Name();
// They should domain-match in one direction or the other. (See RFC 6265bis
// section 5.1.3.)
// TODO(chlily): This does not check for the IP address case. This is bad due
// to https://crbug.com/1069935.
bool domain_match =
IsSubdomainOf(DomainWithoutDot(), secure_cookie.DomainWithoutDot()) ||
IsSubdomainOf(secure_cookie.DomainWithoutDot(), DomainWithoutDot());
bool path_match = secure_cookie.IsOnPath(Path());
bool equivalent_for_secure_cookie_matching =
same_partition_key && same_name && domain_match && path_match;
// IsEquivalent() is a stricter check than this.
DCHECK(!IsEquivalent(secure_cookie) || equivalent_for_secure_cookie_matching);
return equivalent_for_secure_cookie_matching;
}
bool CanonicalCookie::IsOnPath(const std::string& url_path) const {
// A zero length would be unsafe for our trailing '/' checks, and
// would also make no sense for our prefix match. The code that
// creates a CanonicalCookie should make sure the path is never zero length,
// but we double check anyway.
if (path_.empty())
return false;
// The Mozilla code broke this into three cases, based on if the cookie path
// was longer, the same length, or shorter than the length of the url path.
// I think the approach below is simpler.
// Make sure the cookie path is a prefix of the url path. If the url path is
// shorter than the cookie path, then the cookie path can't be a prefix.
if (!base::StartsWith(url_path, path_, base::CompareCase::SENSITIVE))
return false;
// |url_path| is >= |path_|, and |path_| is a prefix of |url_path|. If they
// are the are the same length then they are identical, otherwise need an
// additional check:
// In order to avoid in correctly matching a cookie path of /blah
// with a request path of '/blahblah/', we need to make sure that either
// the cookie path ends in a trailing '/', or that we prefix up to a '/'
// in the url path. Since we know that the url path length is greater
// than the cookie path length, it's safe to index one byte past.
if (path_.length() != url_path.length() && path_.back() != '/' &&
url_path[path_.length()] != '/') {
return false;
}
return true;
}
bool CanonicalCookie::IsDomainMatch(const std::string& host) const {
return cookie_util::IsDomainMatch(domain_, host);
}
CookieAccessResult CanonicalCookie::IncludeForRequestURL(
const GURL& url,
const CookieOptions& options,
const CookieAccessParams& params) const {
CookieInclusionStatus status;
// Filter out HttpOnly cookies, per options.
if (options.exclude_httponly() && IsHttpOnly())
status.AddExclusionReason(CookieInclusionStatus::EXCLUDE_HTTP_ONLY);
// Secure cookies should not be included in requests for URLs with an
// insecure scheme, unless it is a localhost url, or the CookieAccessDelegate
// otherwise denotes them as trustworthy
// (`delegate_treats_url_as_trustworthy`).
bool is_allowed_to_access_secure_cookies = false;
CookieAccessScheme cookie_access_scheme =
cookie_util::ProvisionalAccessScheme(url);
if (cookie_access_scheme == CookieAccessScheme::kNonCryptographic &&
params.delegate_treats_url_as_trustworthy) {
cookie_access_scheme = CookieAccessScheme::kTrustworthy;
}
switch (cookie_access_scheme) {
case CookieAccessScheme::kNonCryptographic:
if (IsSecure())
status.AddExclusionReason(CookieInclusionStatus::EXCLUDE_SECURE_ONLY);
break;
case CookieAccessScheme::kTrustworthy:
is_allowed_to_access_secure_cookies = true;
if (IsSecure()) {
status.AddWarningReason(
CookieInclusionStatus::
WARN_SECURE_ACCESS_GRANTED_NON_CRYPTOGRAPHIC);
}
break;
case CookieAccessScheme::kCryptographic:
is_allowed_to_access_secure_cookies = true;
break;
}
// Don't include cookies for requests that don't apply to the cookie domain.
if (!IsDomainMatch(url.host()))
status.AddExclusionReason(CookieInclusionStatus::EXCLUDE_DOMAIN_MISMATCH);
// Don't include cookies for requests with a url path that does not path
// match the cookie-path.
if (!IsOnPath(url.path()))
status.AddExclusionReason(CookieInclusionStatus::EXCLUDE_NOT_ON_PATH);
// For LEGACY cookies we should always return the schemeless context,
// otherwise let GetContextForCookieInclusion() decide.
CookieOptions::SameSiteCookieContext::ContextType cookie_inclusion_context =
params.access_semantics == CookieAccessSemantics::LEGACY
? options.same_site_cookie_context().context()
: options.same_site_cookie_context().GetContextForCookieInclusion();
// Don't include same-site cookies for cross-site requests.
CookieEffectiveSameSite effective_same_site =
GetEffectiveSameSite(params.access_semantics);
DCHECK(effective_same_site != CookieEffectiveSameSite::UNDEFINED);
UMA_HISTOGRAM_ENUMERATION(
"Cookie.RequestSameSiteContext", cookie_inclusion_context,
CookieOptions::SameSiteCookieContext::ContextType::COUNT);
switch (effective_same_site) {
case CookieEffectiveSameSite::STRICT_MODE:
if (cookie_inclusion_context <
CookieOptions::SameSiteCookieContext::ContextType::SAME_SITE_STRICT) {
status.AddExclusionReason(
CookieInclusionStatus::EXCLUDE_SAMESITE_STRICT);
}
break;
case CookieEffectiveSameSite::LAX_MODE:
if (cookie_inclusion_context <
CookieOptions::SameSiteCookieContext::ContextType::SAME_SITE_LAX) {
status.AddExclusionReason(
(SameSite() == CookieSameSite::UNSPECIFIED)
? CookieInclusionStatus::
EXCLUDE_SAMESITE_UNSPECIFIED_TREATED_AS_LAX
: CookieInclusionStatus::EXCLUDE_SAMESITE_LAX);
}
break;
// TODO(crbug.com/990439): Add a browsertest for this behavior.
case CookieEffectiveSameSite::LAX_MODE_ALLOW_UNSAFE:
DCHECK(SameSite() == CookieSameSite::UNSPECIFIED);
if (cookie_inclusion_context <
CookieOptions::SameSiteCookieContext::ContextType::
SAME_SITE_LAX_METHOD_UNSAFE) {
// TODO(chlily): Do we need a separate CookieInclusionStatus for this?
status.AddExclusionReason(
CookieInclusionStatus::EXCLUDE_SAMESITE_UNSPECIFIED_TREATED_AS_LAX);
}
break;
default:
break;
}
// Unless legacy access semantics are in effect, SameSite=None cookies without
// the Secure attribute should be ignored. This can apply to cookies which
// were created before "SameSite=None requires Secure" was enabled (as
// SameSite=None insecure cookies cannot be set while the options are on).
if (params.access_semantics != CookieAccessSemantics::LEGACY &&
SameSite() == CookieSameSite::NO_RESTRICTION && !IsSecure()) {
status.AddExclusionReason(
CookieInclusionStatus::EXCLUDE_SAMESITE_NONE_INSECURE);
}
switch (params.same_party_status) {
case CookieSamePartyStatus::kEnforceSamePartyExclude:
DCHECK(IsSameParty());
status.AddExclusionReason(
CookieInclusionStatus::EXCLUDE_SAMEPARTY_CROSS_PARTY_CONTEXT);
FALLTHROUGH;
case CookieSamePartyStatus::kEnforceSamePartyInclude: {
status.AddWarningReason(CookieInclusionStatus::WARN_TREATED_AS_SAMEPARTY);
// Remove any SameSite exclusion reasons, since SameParty overrides
// SameSite.
DCHECK(!status.HasExclusionReason(
CookieInclusionStatus::EXCLUDE_SAMESITE_STRICT));
DCHECK_NE(effective_same_site, CookieEffectiveSameSite::STRICT_MODE);
bool included_by_samesite =
!status.HasExclusionReason(
CookieInclusionStatus::EXCLUDE_SAMESITE_LAX) &&
!status.HasExclusionReason(
CookieInclusionStatus::
EXCLUDE_SAMESITE_UNSPECIFIED_TREATED_AS_LAX);
if (!included_by_samesite) {
status.RemoveExclusionReasons({
CookieInclusionStatus::EXCLUDE_SAMESITE_LAX,
CookieInclusionStatus::EXCLUDE_SAMESITE_UNSPECIFIED_TREATED_AS_LAX,
});
}
// Update metrics.
if (status.HasOnlyExclusionReason(
CookieInclusionStatus::EXCLUDE_SAMEPARTY_CROSS_PARTY_CONTEXT) &&
included_by_samesite) {
status.AddWarningReason(
CookieInclusionStatus::WARN_SAMEPARTY_EXCLUSION_OVERRULED_SAMESITE);
}
if (status.IsInclude()) {
UMA_HISTOGRAM_BOOLEAN(