From a98378c29fda0448eb541da9dd226ca5e6692ee4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Alex Gough Date: Wed, 8 Jul 2020 16:31:55 +0000 Subject: [PATCH] Include bug cases where Chrome breaks OS security boundaries. Change-Id: I17c60ddb3294cc16dd41ff54d86ca95a741aff61 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/2284209 Reviewed-by: Max Moroz Reviewed-by: Robert Sesek Reviewed-by: Adrian Taylor Commit-Queue: Alex Gough Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#786321} --- docs/security/faq.md | 11 +++++++++++ 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+) diff --git a/docs/security/faq.md b/docs/security/faq.md index d0e30010c84d8b..6cdff5cfef6e62 100644 --- a/docs/security/faq.md +++ b/docs/security/faq.md @@ -152,6 +152,17 @@ No. Chromium once contained a reflected XSS filter called the [XSSAuditor](https that was a best-effort second line of defense against reflected XSS flaws found in web sites. The XSS Auditor was [removed in Chrome 78](https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/forum/#!msg/blink-dev/TuYw-EZhO9g/blGViehIAwAJ). + +## What if a Chrome component breaks an OS security boundary? + +If Chrome or any of its components (e.g. updater) can be abused to +perform a local privilege escalation, then it may be treated as a +valid security vulnerability. + +Running any Chrome component with higher privileges than intended is +not a security bug and we do not recommend running Chrome as an +Administrator on Windows, or as root on POSIX. + ## Why aren't physically-local attacks in Chrome's threat model?