ptrace: restore smp_rmb() in __ptrace_may_access()

Restore the read memory barrier in __ptrace_may_access() that was deleted
a couple years ago. Also add comments on this barrier and the one it pairs
with to explain why they're there (as far as I understand).

Fixes: bfedb58 ("mm: Add a user_ns owner to mm_struct and fix ptrace permission checks")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>

kernel/cred.c

@@ -450,6 +450,15 @@ int commit_creds(struct cred *new)
 		if (task->mm)
 			set_dumpable(task->mm, suid_dumpable);
 		task->pdeath_signal = 0;
+		/*
+		 * If a task drops privileges and becomes nondumpable,
+		 * the dumpability change must become visible before
+		 * the credential change; otherwise, a __ptrace_may_access()
+		 * racing with this change may be able to attach to a task it
+		 * shouldn't be able to attach to (as if the task had dropped
+		 * privileges without becoming nondumpable).
+		 * Pairs with a read barrier in __ptrace_may_access().
+		 */
 		smp_wmb();
 	}
 

kernel/ptrace.c

@@ -323,6 +323,16 @@ static int __ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *task, unsigned int mode)
 	return -EPERM;
 ok:
 	rcu_read_unlock();
+	/*
+	 * If a task drops privileges and becomes nondumpable (through a syscall
+	 * like setresuid()) while we are trying to access it, we must ensure
+	 * that the dumpability is read after the credentials; otherwise,
+	 * we may be able to attach to a task that we shouldn't be able to
+	 * attach to (as if the task had dropped privileges without becoming
+	 * nondumpable).
+	 * Pairs with a write barrier in commit_creds().
+	 */
+	smp_rmb();
 	mm = task->mm;
 	if (mm &&
 	    ((get_dumpable(mm) != SUID_DUMP_USER) &&