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Improve some NatSpec (#3809)
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Co-authored-by: JulissaDantes <julissadcj@gmail.com>
(cherry picked from commit 8f8fd84)
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frangio committed Nov 25, 2022
1 parent 49c0e43 commit 53eb531
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Showing 4 changed files with 33 additions and 5 deletions.
3 changes: 3 additions & 0 deletions contracts/token/ERC20/extensions/ERC20Votes.sol
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -263,6 +263,9 @@ abstract contract ERC20Votes is IVotes, ERC20Permit {
return a - b;
}

/**
* @dev Access an element of the array without performing bounds check. The position is assumed to be within bounds.
*/
function _unsafeAccess(Checkpoint[] storage ckpts, uint256 pos) private pure returns (Checkpoint storage result) {
assembly {
mstore(0, ckpts.slot)
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17 changes: 14 additions & 3 deletions contracts/token/ERC20/extensions/ERC4626.sol
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -17,8 +17,12 @@ import "../../../utils/math/Math.sol";
* the ERC20 standard. Any additional extensions included along it would affect the "shares" token represented by this
* contract and not the "assets" token which is an independent contract.
*
* CAUTION: Deposits and withdrawals may incur unexpected slippage. Users should verify that the amount received of
* shares or assets is as expected. EOAs should operate through a wrapper that performs these checks such as
* CAUTION: When the vault is empty or nearly empty, deposits are at high risk of being stolen through frontrunning with
* a "donation" to the vault that inflates the price of a share. This is variously known as a donation or inflation
* attack and is essentially a problem of slippage. Vault deployers can protect against this attack by making an initial
* deposit of a non-trivial amount of the asset, such that price manipulation becomes infeasible. Withdrawals may
* similarly be affected by slippage. Users can protect against this attack as well unexpected slippage in general by
* verifying the amount received is as expected, using a wrapper that performs these checks such as
* https://github.com/fei-protocol/ERC4626#erc4626router-and-base[ERC4626Router].
*
* _Available since v4.7._
Expand Down Expand Up @@ -134,7 +138,11 @@ abstract contract ERC4626 is ERC20, IERC4626 {
return shares;
}

/** @dev See {IERC4626-mint}. */
/** @dev See {IERC4626-mint}.
*
* As opposed to {deposit}, minting is allowed even if the vault is in a state where the price of a share is zero.
* In this case, the shares will be minted without requiring any assets to be deposited.
*/
function mint(uint256 shares, address receiver) public virtual override returns (uint256) {
require(shares <= maxMint(receiver), "ERC4626: mint more than max");

Expand Down Expand Up @@ -267,6 +275,9 @@ abstract contract ERC4626 is ERC20, IERC4626 {
emit Withdraw(caller, receiver, owner, assets, shares);
}

/**
* @dev Checks if vault is "healthy" in the sense of having assets backing the circulating shares.
*/
function _isVaultCollateralized() private view returns (bool) {
return totalAssets() > 0 || totalSupply() == 0;
}
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12 changes: 11 additions & 1 deletion contracts/utils/Checkpoints.sol
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -28,7 +28,8 @@ library Checkpoints {

/**
* @dev Returns the value at a given block number. If a checkpoint is not available at that block, the closest one
* before it is returned, or zero otherwise.
* before it is returned, or zero otherwise. Because the number returned corresponds to that at the end of the
* block, the requested block number must be in the past, excluding the current block.
*/
function getAtBlock(History storage self, uint256 blockNumber) internal view returns (uint256) {
require(blockNumber < block.number, "Checkpoints: block not yet mined");
Expand Down Expand Up @@ -205,6 +206,9 @@ library Checkpoints {
return high;
}

/**
* @dev Access an element of the array without performing bounds check. The position is assumed to be within bounds.
*/
function _unsafeAccess(Checkpoint[] storage self, uint256 pos) private pure returns (Checkpoint storage result) {
assembly {
mstore(0, self.slot)
Expand Down Expand Up @@ -366,6 +370,9 @@ library Checkpoints {
return high;
}

/**
* @dev Access an element of the array without performing bounds check. The position is assumed to be within bounds.
*/
function _unsafeAccess(Checkpoint224[] storage self, uint256 pos)
private
pure
Expand Down Expand Up @@ -531,6 +538,9 @@ library Checkpoints {
return high;
}

/**
* @dev Access an element of the array without performing bounds check. The position is assumed to be within bounds.
*/
function _unsafeAccess(Checkpoint160[] storage self, uint256 pos)
private
pure
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6 changes: 5 additions & 1 deletion scripts/generate/templates/Checkpoints.js
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -67,7 +67,8 @@ function upperLookup(${opts.historyTypeName} storage self, ${opts.keyTypeName} k
const legacyOperations = opts => `\
/**
* @dev Returns the value at a given block number. If a checkpoint is not available at that block, the closest one
* before it is returned, or zero otherwise.
* before it is returned, or zero otherwise. Because the number returned corresponds to that at the end of the
* block, the requested block number must be in the past, excluding the current block.
*/
function getAtBlock(${opts.historyTypeName} storage self, uint256 blockNumber) internal view returns (uint256) {
require(blockNumber < block.number, "Checkpoints: block not yet mined");
Expand Down Expand Up @@ -246,6 +247,9 @@ function _lowerBinaryLookup(
return high;
}
/**
* @dev Access an element of the array without performing bounds check. The position is assumed to be within bounds.
*/
function _unsafeAccess(${opts.checkpointTypeName}[] storage self, uint256 pos)
private
pure
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