[Detection Engine] Adds 8.6 rules (#145256)

## Summary Pull updates to detection rules from https://github.com/elastic/detection-rules/tree/64dd305867582d4c10cea2380d7831ad782dff20. ### Checklist Delete any items that are not applicable to this PR. - [x] Any text added follows [EUI's writing guidelines](https://elastic.github.io/eui/#/guidelines/writing), uses sentence case text and includes [i18n support](https://github.com/elastic/kibana/blob/main/packages/kbn-i18n/README.md)
elastic · Nov 16, 2022 · d17527a · d17527a
1 parent 421c2fb
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diff --git a/...rebuilt_rules/content/prepackaged_rules/collection_email_powershell_exchange_mailbox.json b/...rebuilt_rules/content/prepackaged_rules/collection_email_powershell_exchange_mailbox.json
@@ -10,7 +10,8 @@
   "index": [
     "logs-endpoint.events.*",
     "winlogbeat-*",
-    "logs-windows.*"
+    "logs-windows.*",
+    "endgame-*"
   ],
   "language": "eql",
   "license": "Elastic License v2",
@@ -48,7 +49,8 @@
     "Windows",
     "Threat Detection",
     "Collection",
-    "has_guide"
+    "has_guide",
+    "Elastic Endgame"
   ],
   "threat": [
     {
@@ -81,5 +83,5 @@
   ],
   "timestamp_override": "event.ingested",
   "type": "eql",
-  "version": 101
+  "version": 102
 }
diff --git a/...tection_engine/prebuilt_rules/content/prepackaged_rules/collection_winrar_encryption.json b/...tection_engine/prebuilt_rules/content/prepackaged_rules/collection_winrar_encryption.json
@@ -7,7 +7,8 @@
   "index": [
     "logs-endpoint.events.*",
     "winlogbeat-*",
-    "logs-windows.*"
+    "logs-windows.*",
+    "endgame-*"
   ],
   "language": "eql",
   "license": "Elastic License v2",
@@ -54,7 +55,8 @@
     "Windows",
     "Threat Detection",
     "Collection",
-    "has_guide"
+    "has_guide",
+    "Elastic Endgame"
   ],
   "threat": [
     {
@@ -82,5 +84,5 @@
   ],
   "timestamp_override": "event.ingested",
   "type": "eql",
-  "version": 101
+  "version": 102
 }
diff --git a/...and_and_control_telnet_port_activity.json → ...epted_default_telnet_port_connection.json b/...and_and_control_telnet_port_activity.json → ...epted_default_telnet_port_connection.json
@@ -15,22 +15,27 @@
   ],
   "language": "kuery",
   "license": "Elastic License v2",
-  "name": "Telnet Port Activity",
-  "query": "event.category:(network or network_traffic) and network.transport:tcp and destination.port:23\n",
+  "name": "Accepted Default Telnet Port Connection",
+  "query": "event.category:(network or network_traffic) and destination.port:23\n  and network.direction:(inbound or ingress or outbound or egress)\n  and not event.action:(\n      flow_dropped or denied or deny or\n      flow_terminated or timeout or Reject or network_flow)\n",
   "required_fields": [
     {
       "ecs": true,
       "name": "destination.port",
       "type": "long"
     },
+    {
+      "ecs": true,
+      "name": "event.action",
+      "type": "keyword"
+    },
     {
       "ecs": true,
       "name": "event.category",
       "type": "keyword"
     },
     {
       "ecs": true,
-      "name": "network.transport",
+      "name": "network.direction",
       "type": "keyword"
     }
   ],
@@ -43,7 +48,9 @@
     "Network",
     "Threat Detection",
     "Command and Control",
-    "Host"
+    "Host",
+    "Lateral Movement",
+    "Initial Access"
   ],
   "threat": [
     {
@@ -90,5 +97,5 @@
   "timeline_title": "Comprehensive Network Timeline",
   "timestamp_override": "event.ingested",
   "type": "query",
-  "version": 100
+  "version": 101
 }
diff --git a/...ne/prebuilt_rules/content/prepackaged_rules/command_and_control_cobalt_strike_beacon.json b/...ne/prebuilt_rules/content/prepackaged_rules/command_and_control_cobalt_strike_beacon.json
@@ -20,7 +20,8 @@
   "query": "event.category:(network OR network_traffic) AND type:(tls OR http) AND network.transport:tcp AND destination.domain:/[a-z]{3}.stage.[0-9]{8}\\..*/\n",
   "references": [
     "https://blog.morphisec.com/fin7-attacks-restaurant-industry",
-    "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/04/fin7-phishing-lnk.html"
+    "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/04/fin7-phishing-lnk.html",
+    "https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/collecting-cobalt-strike-beacons-with-the-elastic-stack"
   ],
   "risk_score": 73,
   "rule_id": "cf53f532-9cc9-445a-9ae7-fced307ec53c",
@@ -63,5 +64,5 @@
   ],
   "timestamp_override": "event.ingested",
   "type": "query",
-  "version": 100
+  "version": 101
 }
diff --git a/.../content/prepackaged_rules/command_and_control_cobalt_strike_default_teamserver_cert.json b/.../content/prepackaged_rules/command_and_control_cobalt_strike_default_teamserver_cert.json
@@ -20,7 +20,8 @@
     "https://www.cobaltstrike.com/help-setup-collaboration",
     "https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/packetbeat/current/configuration-tls.html",
     "https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/filebeat/7.9/filebeat-module-suricata.html",
-    "https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/filebeat/7.9/filebeat-module-zeek.html"
+    "https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/filebeat/7.9/filebeat-module-zeek.html",
+    "https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/collecting-cobalt-strike-beacons-with-the-elastic-stack"
   ],
   "required_fields": [
     {
@@ -81,5 +82,5 @@
   ],
   "timestamp_override": "event.ingested",
   "type": "query",
-  "version": 100
+  "version": 101
 }
diff --git a/...gine/prebuilt_rules/content/prepackaged_rules/command_and_control_common_webservices.json b/...gine/prebuilt_rules/content/prepackaged_rules/command_and_control_common_webservices.json
@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@
   "license": "Elastic License v2",
   "name": "Connection to Commonly Abused Web Services",
   "note": "## Triage and analysis\n\n### Investigating Connection to Commonly Abused Web Services\n\nAdversaries may use an existing, legitimate external Web service as a means for relaying data to/from a compromised\nsystem. Popular websites and social media acting as a mechanism for C2 may give a significant amount of cover due to the\nlikelihood that hosts within a network are already communicating with them prior to a compromise.\n\nThis rule looks for processes outside known legitimate program locations communicating with a list of services that can\nbe abused for exfiltration or command and control.\n\n#### Possible investigation steps\n\n- Investigate the script execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for\nprevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.\n- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.\n- Verify whether the digital signature exists in the executable.\n- Identify the operation type (upload, download, tunneling, etc.).\n- Retrieve the process executable and determine if it is malicious:\n  - Use a private sandboxed malware analysis system to perform analysis.\n    - Observe and collect information about the following activities:\n      - Attempts to contact external domains and addresses.\n      - File and registry access, modification, and creation activities.\n      - Service creation and launch activities.\n      - Scheduled task creation.\n  - Use the PowerShell Get-FileHash cmdlet to get the files' SHA-256 hash values.\n    - Search for the existence and reputation of the hashes in resources like VirusTotal, Hybrid-Analysis, CISCO Talos, Any.run, etc.\n\n### False positive analysis\n\n- This rule has a high chance to produce false positives because it detects communication with legitimate services. Noisy\nfalse positives can be added as exceptions.\n\n### Response and remediation\n\n- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.\n- Isolate the involved host to prevent further post-compromise behavior.\n- If the triage identified malware, search the environment for additional compromised hosts.\n  - Implement temporary network rules, procedures, and segmentation to contain the malware.\n  - Stop suspicious processes.\n  - Immediately block the identified indicators of compromise (IoCs).\n  - Inspect the affected systems for additional malware backdoors like reverse shells, reverse proxies, or droppers that\n  attackers could use to reinfect the system.\n- Remove and block malicious artifacts identified during triage.\n- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and\nmalware components.\n- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.\n- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the\nmean time to respond (MTTR).\n",
-  "query": "network where network.protocol == \"dns\" and\n    process.name != null and user.id not in (\"S-1-5-18\", \"S-1-5-19\", \"S-1-5-20\") and\n    /* Add new WebSvc domains here */\n    dns.question.name :\n    (\n        \"raw.githubusercontent.*\",\n        \"*.pastebin.*\",\n        \"*drive.google.*\",\n        \"*docs.live.*\",\n        \"*api.dropboxapi.*\",\n        \"*dropboxusercontent.*\",\n        \"*onedrive.*\",\n        \"*4shared.*\",\n        \"*.file.io\",\n        \"*filebin.net\",\n        \"*slack-files.com\",\n        \"*ghostbin.*\",\n        \"*ngrok.*\",\n        \"*portmap.*\",\n        \"*serveo.net\",\n        \"*localtunnel.me\",\n        \"*pagekite.me\",\n        \"*localxpose.io\",\n        \"*notabug.org\",\n        \"rawcdn.githack.*\",\n        \"paste.nrecom.net\",\n        \"zerobin.net\",\n        \"controlc.com\",\n        \"requestbin.net\",\n        \"cdn.discordapp.com\",\n        \"discordapp.com\",\n        \"discord.com\"\n    ) and\n    /* Insert noisy false positives here */\n    not process.executable :\n    (\n      \"?:\\\\Program Files\\\\*.exe\",\n      \"?:\\\\Program Files (x86)\\\\*.exe\",\n      \"?:\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\WWAHost.exe\",\n      \"?:\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\smartscreen.exe\",\n      \"?:\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\MicrosoftEdgeCP.exe\",\n      \"?:\\\\ProgramData\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows Defender\\\\Platform\\\\*\\\\MsMpEng.exe\",\n      \"?:\\\\Users\\\\*\\\\AppData\\\\Local\\\\Google\\\\Chrome\\\\Application\\\\chrome.exe\",\n      \"?:\\\\Users\\\\*\\\\AppData\\\\Local\\\\Programs\\\\Fiddler\\\\Fiddler.exe\",\n      \"?:\\\\Users\\\\*\\\\AppData\\\\Local\\\\Programs\\\\Microsoft VS Code\\\\Code.exe\",\n      \"?:\\\\Users\\\\*\\\\AppData\\\\Local\\\\Microsoft\\\\OneDrive\\\\OneDrive.exe\",\n      \"?:\\\\Windows\\\\system32\\\\mobsync.exe\",\n      \"?:\\\\Windows\\\\SysWOW64\\\\mobsync.exe\",\n      \"?:\\\\Users\\\\*\\\\AppData\\\\Local\\\\Discord\\\\app-*\\\\Discord.exe\"\n    )\n",
+  "query": "network where network.protocol == \"dns\" and\n    process.name != null and user.id not in (\"S-1-5-18\", \"S-1-5-19\", \"S-1-5-20\") and\n    /* Add new WebSvc domains here */\n    dns.question.name :\n    (\n        \"raw.githubusercontent.*\",\n        \"*.pastebin.*\",\n        \"*drive.google.*\",\n        \"*docs.live.*\",\n        \"*api.dropboxapi.*\",\n        \"*dropboxusercontent.*\",\n        \"*onedrive.*\",\n        \"*4shared.*\",\n        \"*.file.io\",\n        \"*filebin.net\",\n        \"*slack-files.com\",\n        \"*ghostbin.*\",\n        \"*ngrok.*\",\n        \"*portmap.*\",\n        \"*serveo.net\",\n        \"*localtunnel.me\",\n        \"*pagekite.me\",\n        \"*localxpose.io\",\n        \"*notabug.org\",\n        \"rawcdn.githack.*\",\n        \"paste.nrecom.net\",\n        \"zerobin.net\",\n        \"controlc.com\",\n        \"requestbin.net\",\n        \"cdn.discordapp.com\",\n        \"discordapp.com\",\n        \"discord.com\",\n        \"script.google.com\",\n        \"script.googleusercontent.com\"\n    ) and\n    /* Insert noisy false positives here */\n    not process.executable :\n    (\n      \"?:\\\\Program Files\\\\*.exe\",\n      \"?:\\\\Program Files (x86)\\\\*.exe\",\n      \"?:\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\WWAHost.exe\",\n      \"?:\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\smartscreen.exe\",\n      \"?:\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\MicrosoftEdgeCP.exe\",\n      \"?:\\\\ProgramData\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows Defender\\\\Platform\\\\*\\\\MsMpEng.exe\",\n      \"?:\\\\Users\\\\*\\\\AppData\\\\Local\\\\Google\\\\Chrome\\\\Application\\\\chrome.exe\",\n      \"?:\\\\Users\\\\*\\\\AppData\\\\Local\\\\Programs\\\\Fiddler\\\\Fiddler.exe\",\n      \"?:\\\\Users\\\\*\\\\AppData\\\\Local\\\\Programs\\\\Microsoft VS Code\\\\Code.exe\",\n      \"?:\\\\Users\\\\*\\\\AppData\\\\Local\\\\Microsoft\\\\OneDrive\\\\OneDrive.exe\",\n      \"?:\\\\Windows\\\\system32\\\\mobsync.exe\",\n      \"?:\\\\Windows\\\\SysWOW64\\\\mobsync.exe\",\n      \"?:\\\\Users\\\\*\\\\AppData\\\\Local\\\\Discord\\\\app-*\\\\Discord.exe\"\n    )\n",
   "required_fields": [
     {
       "ecs": true,
@@ -96,5 +96,5 @@
   ],
   "timestamp_override": "event.ingested",
   "type": "eql",
-  "version": 101
+  "version": 102
 }
diff --git a/.../prebuilt_rules/content/prepackaged_rules/command_and_control_dns_tunneling_nslookup.json b/.../prebuilt_rules/content/prepackaged_rules/command_and_control_dns_tunneling_nslookup.json
@@ -7,7 +7,8 @@
   "index": [
     "winlogbeat-*",
     "logs-endpoint.events.*",
-    "logs-windows.*"
+    "logs-windows.*",
+    "endgame-*"
   ],
   "language": "kuery",
   "license": "Elastic License v2",
@@ -48,7 +49,8 @@
     "Windows",
     "Threat Detection",
     "Command and Control",
-    "has_guide"
+    "has_guide",
+    "Elastic Endgame"
   ],
   "threat": [
     {
@@ -81,5 +83,5 @@
     "value": 15
   },
   "type": "threshold",
-  "version": 101
+  "version": 102
 }
diff --git a/...t_rules/content/prepackaged_rules/command_and_control_port_forwarding_added_registry.json b/...t_rules/content/prepackaged_rules/command_and_control_port_forwarding_added_registry.json
@@ -7,13 +7,14 @@
   "index": [
     "winlogbeat-*",
     "logs-endpoint.events.*",
-    "logs-windows.*"
+    "logs-windows.*",
+    "endgame-*"
   ],
   "language": "eql",
   "license": "Elastic License v2",
   "name": "Port Forwarding Rule Addition",
   "note": "## Triage and analysis\n\n### Investigating Port Forwarding Rule Addition\n\nNetwork port forwarding is a mechanism to redirect incoming TCP connections (IPv4 or IPv6) from the local TCP port to\nany other port number, or even to a port on a remote computer.\n\nAttackers may configure port forwarding rules to bypass network segmentation restrictions, using the host as a jump box\nto access previously unreachable systems.\n\nThis rule monitors the modifications to the `HKLM\\SYSTEM\\*ControlSet*\\Services\\PortProxy\\v4tov4\\` subkeys.\n\n#### Possible investigation steps\n\n- Investigate the process execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files\nfor prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.\n- Identify the user account that performed the action and whether it should perform this kind of action.\n- Contact the account and system owners and confirm whether they are aware of this activity.\n- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.\n- Assess whether this behavior is prevalent in the environment by looking for similar occurrences across hosts.\n- Identify the target host IP address, check the connections originating from the host where the modification occurred,\nand inspect the credentials used.\n  - Investigate suspicious login activity, such as unauthorized access and logins from outside working hours and unusual locations.\n\n### False positive analysis\n\n- This mechanism can be used legitimately. Analysts can dismiss the alert if the Administrator is aware of the activity\nand there are justifications for this configuration.\n- If this rule is noisy in your environment due to expected activity, consider adding exceptions \u2014 preferably with a combination\nof user and command line conditions.\n\n### Response and remediation\n\n- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.\n- Delete the port forwarding rule.\n- Isolate the involved host to prevent further post-compromise behavior.\n- If the triage identified malware, search the environment for additional compromised hosts.\n  - Implement temporary network rules, procedures, and segmentation to contain the malware.\n  - Stop suspicious processes.\n  - Immediately block the identified indicators of compromise (IoCs).\n  - Inspect the affected systems for additional malware backdoors like reverse shells, reverse proxies, or droppers that\n  attackers could use to reinfect the system.\n- Remove and block malicious artifacts identified during triage.\n- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and\nmalware components.\n- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are\nidentified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business\nsystems, and web services.\n- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.\n- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the\nmean time to respond (MTTR).",
-  "query": "registry where registry.path : \"HKLM\\\\SYSTEM\\\\*ControlSet*\\\\Services\\\\PortProxy\\\\v4tov4\\\\*\"\n",
+  "query": "registry where registry.path : (\n  \"HKLM\\\\SYSTEM\\\\*ControlSet*\\\\Services\\\\PortProxy\\\\v4tov4\\\\*\",\n  \"\\\\REGISTRY\\\\MACHINE\\\\SYSTEM\\\\*ControlSet*\\\\Services\\\\PortProxy\\\\v4tov4\\\\*\"\n)\n",
   "references": [
     "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/01/bypassing-network-restrictions-through-rdp-tunneling.html"
   ],
@@ -34,7 +35,8 @@
     "Windows",
     "Threat Detection",
     "Command and Control",
-    "has_guide"
+    "has_guide",
+    "Elastic Endgame"
   ],
   "threat": [
     {
@@ -55,5 +57,5 @@
   ],
   "timestamp_override": "event.ingested",
   "type": "eql",
-  "version": 101
+  "version": 102
 }
diff --git a/...engine/prebuilt_rules/content/prepackaged_rules/command_and_control_rdp_tunnel_plink.json b/...engine/prebuilt_rules/content/prepackaged_rules/command_and_control_rdp_tunnel_plink.json
@@ -7,7 +7,8 @@
   "index": [
     "logs-endpoint.events.*",
     "winlogbeat-*",
-    "logs-windows.*"
+    "logs-windows.*",
+    "endgame-*"
   ],
   "language": "eql",
   "license": "Elastic License v2",
@@ -39,7 +40,8 @@
     "Windows",
     "Threat Detection",
     "Command and Control",
-    "has_guide"
+    "has_guide",
+    "Elastic Endgame"
   ],
   "threat": [
     {
@@ -60,5 +62,5 @@
   ],
   "timestamp_override": "event.ingested",
   "type": "eql",
-  "version": 101
+  "version": 102
 }
diff --git a/...les/content/prepackaged_rules/command_and_control_remote_file_copy_desktopimgdownldr.json b/...les/content/prepackaged_rules/command_and_control_remote_file_copy_desktopimgdownldr.json
@@ -7,7 +7,8 @@
   "index": [
     "winlogbeat-*",
     "logs-endpoint.events.*",
-    "logs-windows.*"
+    "logs-windows.*",
+    "endgame-*"
   ],
   "language": "eql",
   "license": "Elastic License v2",
@@ -49,7 +50,8 @@
     "Windows",
     "Threat Detection",
     "Command and Control",
-    "has_guide"
+    "has_guide",
+    "Elastic Endgame"
   ],
   "threat": [
     {
@@ -70,5 +72,5 @@
   ],
   "timestamp_override": "event.ingested",
   "type": "eql",
-  "version": 101
+  "version": 102
 }
diff --git a/...ebuilt_rules/content/prepackaged_rules/command_and_control_remote_file_copy_mpcmdrun.json b/...ebuilt_rules/content/prepackaged_rules/command_and_control_remote_file_copy_mpcmdrun.json
@@ -7,7 +7,8 @@
   "index": [
     "winlogbeat-*",
     "logs-endpoint.events.*",
-    "logs-windows.*"
+    "logs-windows.*",
+    "endgame-*"
   ],
   "language": "eql",
   "license": "Elastic License v2",
@@ -50,7 +51,8 @@
     "Windows",
     "Threat Detection",
     "Command and Control",
-    "has_guide"
+    "has_guide",
+    "Elastic Endgame"
   ],
   "threat": [
     {
@@ -71,5 +73,5 @@
   ],
   "timestamp_override": "event.ingested",
   "type": "eql",
-  "version": 101
+  "version": 102
 }
diff --git a/...uilt_rules/content/prepackaged_rules/command_and_control_teamviewer_remote_file_copy.json b/...uilt_rules/content/prepackaged_rules/command_and_control_teamviewer_remote_file_copy.json
@@ -7,7 +7,8 @@
   "index": [
     "winlogbeat-*",
     "logs-endpoint.events.*",
-    "logs-windows.*"
+    "logs-windows.*",
+    "endgame-*"
   ],
   "language": "eql",
   "license": "Elastic License v2",
@@ -44,7 +45,8 @@
     "Windows",
     "Threat Detection",
     "Command and Control",
-    "has_guide"
+    "has_guide",
+    "Elastic Endgame"
   ],
   "threat": [
     {
@@ -70,5 +72,5 @@
   ],
   "timestamp_override": "event.ingested",
   "type": "eql",
-  "version": 101
+  "version": 102
 }
diff --git a/...built_rules/content/prepackaged_rules/credential_access_attempted_bypass_of_okta_mfa.json b/...built_rules/content/prepackaged_rules/credential_access_attempted_bypass_of_okta_mfa.json
@@ -14,7 +14,8 @@
   "query": "event.dataset:okta.system and event.action:user.mfa.attempt_bypass\n",
   "references": [
     "https://developer.okta.com/docs/reference/api/system-log/",
-    "https://developer.okta.com/docs/reference/api/event-types/"
+    "https://developer.okta.com/docs/reference/api/event-types/",
+    "https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/testing-okta-visibility-and-detection-dorothy"
   ],
   "related_integrations": [
     {
@@ -65,5 +66,5 @@
   ],
   "timestamp_override": "event.ingested",
   "type": "query",
-  "version": 101
+  "version": 102
 }
diff --git a/...ontent/prepackaged_rules/credential_access_attempts_to_brute_force_okta_user_account.json b/...ontent/prepackaged_rules/credential_access_attempts_to_brute_force_okta_user_account.json
@@ -17,7 +17,8 @@
   "query": "event.dataset:okta.system and event.action:user.account.lock\n",
   "references": [
     "https://developer.okta.com/docs/reference/api/system-log/",
-    "https://developer.okta.com/docs/reference/api/event-types/"
+    "https://developer.okta.com/docs/reference/api/event-types/",
+    "https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/testing-okta-visibility-and-detection-dorothy"
   ],
   "related_integrations": [
     {
@@ -73,5 +74,5 @@
     "value": 3
   },
   "type": "threshold",
-  "version": 101
+  "version": 102
 }
diff --git a/..._engine/prebuilt_rules/content/prepackaged_rules/credential_access_cmdline_dump_tool.json b/..._engine/prebuilt_rules/content/prepackaged_rules/credential_access_cmdline_dump_tool.json
@@ -7,7 +7,8 @@
   "index": [
     "winlogbeat-*",
     "logs-endpoint.events.*",
-    "logs-windows.*"
+    "logs-windows.*",
+    "endgame-*"
   ],
   "language": "eql",
   "license": "Elastic License v2",
@@ -59,7 +60,8 @@
     "Windows",
     "Threat Detection",
     "Credential Access",
-    "has_guide"
+    "has_guide",
+    "Elastic Endgame"
   ],
   "threat": [
     {
@@ -92,5 +94,5 @@
   ],
   "timestamp_override": "event.ingested",
   "type": "eql",
-  "version": 101
+  "version": 102
 }