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Add tests for the host checking logic, clarify the behaviors. #20328

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Jul 13, 2022
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1 change: 1 addition & 0 deletions custom/conf/app.example.ini
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -2232,6 +2232,7 @@ ROUTER = console
;BLOCKED_DOMAINS =
;;
;; Allow private addresses defined by RFC 1918, RFC 1122, RFC 4632 and RFC 4291 (false by default)
;; If a domain is allowed by ALLOWED_DOMAINS, this option will be ignored.
;ALLOW_LOCALNETWORKS = false

;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;
Expand Down
2 changes: 1 addition & 1 deletion docs/content/doc/advanced/config-cheat-sheet.en-us.md
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -1083,7 +1083,7 @@ Task queue configuration has been moved to `queue.task`. However, the below conf
- `RETRY_BACKOFF`: **3**: Backoff time per http/https request retry (seconds)
- `ALLOWED_DOMAINS`: **\<empty\>**: Domains allowlist for migrating repositories, default is blank. It means everything will be allowed. Multiple domains could be separated by commas. Wildcard is supported: `github.com, *.github.com`.
- `BLOCKED_DOMAINS`: **\<empty\>**: Domains blocklist for migrating repositories, default is blank. Multiple domains could be separated by commas. When `ALLOWED_DOMAINS` is not blank, this option has a higher priority to deny domains. Wildcard is supported.
- `ALLOW_LOCALNETWORKS`: **false**: Allow private addresses defined by RFC 1918, RFC 1122, RFC 4632 and RFC 4291
- `ALLOW_LOCALNETWORKS`: **false**: Allow private addresses defined by RFC 1918, RFC 1122, RFC 4632 and RFC 4291. If a domain is allowed by `ALLOWED_DOMAINS`, this option will be ignored.
- `SKIP_TLS_VERIFY`: **false**: Allow skip tls verify

## Federation (`federation`)
Expand Down
8 changes: 4 additions & 4 deletions modules/hostmatcher/hostmatcher.go
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -125,14 +125,14 @@ func (hl *HostMatchList) checkIP(ip net.IP) bool {

// MatchHostName checks if the host matches an allow/deny(block) list
func (hl *HostMatchList) MatchHostName(host string) bool {
if hl == nil {
return false
}

hostname, _, err := net.SplitHostPort(host)
if err != nil {
hostname = host
}

if hl == nil {
return false
}
if hl.checkPattern(hostname) {
return true
}
Expand Down
11 changes: 8 additions & 3 deletions services/migrations/migrate.go
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -84,7 +84,10 @@ func IsMigrateURLAllowed(remoteURL string, doer *user_model.User) error {

// some users only use proxy, there is no DNS resolver. it's safe to ignore the LookupIP error
addrList, _ := net.LookupIP(hostName)
return checkByAllowBlockList(hostName, addrList)
}

func checkByAllowBlockList(hostName string, addrList []net.IP) error {
var ipAllowed bool
var ipBlocked bool
for _, addr := range addrList {
Expand All @@ -93,12 +96,12 @@ func IsMigrateURLAllowed(remoteURL string, doer *user_model.User) error {
}
var blockedError error
if blockList.MatchHostName(hostName) || ipBlocked {
blockedError = &models.ErrInvalidCloneAddr{Host: u.Host, IsPermissionDenied: true}
blockedError = &models.ErrInvalidCloneAddr{Host: hostName, IsPermissionDenied: true}
}
// if we have an allow-list, check the allow-list first
// if we have an allow-list, check the allow-list before return to get the more accurate error
if !allowList.IsEmpty() {
if !allowList.MatchHostName(hostName) && !ipAllowed {
return &models.ErrInvalidCloneAddr{Host: u.Host, IsPermissionDenied: true}
return &models.ErrInvalidCloneAddr{Host: hostName, IsPermissionDenied: true}
}
}
// otherwise, we always follow the blocked list
Expand Down Expand Up @@ -474,5 +477,7 @@ func Init() error {
allowList.AppendBuiltin(hostmatcher.MatchBuiltinPrivate)
allowList.AppendBuiltin(hostmatcher.MatchBuiltinLoopback)
}
// TODO: at the moment, if ALLOW_LOCALNETWORKS=false, ALLOWED_DOMAINS=domain.com, and domain.com has IP 127.0.0.1, then it's still allowed.
// if we want to block such case, the private&loopback should be added to the blockList when ALLOW_LOCALNETWORKS=false
return nil
}
40 changes: 40 additions & 0 deletions services/migrations/migrate_test.go
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -5,6 +5,7 @@
package migrations

import (
"net"
"path/filepath"
"testing"

Expand Down Expand Up @@ -74,3 +75,42 @@ func TestMigrateWhiteBlocklist(t *testing.T) {

setting.ImportLocalPaths = old
}

func TestAllowBlockList(t *testing.T) {
init := func(allow, block string, local bool) {
setting.Migrations.AllowedDomains = allow
setting.Migrations.BlockedDomains = block
setting.Migrations.AllowLocalNetworks = local
assert.NoError(t, Init())
}

// default, allow all external, block none, no local networks
init("", "", false)
assert.NoError(t, checkByAllowBlockList("domain.com", []net.IP{net.ParseIP("1.2.3.4")}))
assert.Error(t, checkByAllowBlockList("domain.com", []net.IP{net.ParseIP("127.0.0.1")}))

// allow all including local networks (it could lead to SSRF in production)
init("", "", true)
assert.NoError(t, checkByAllowBlockList("domain.com", []net.IP{net.ParseIP("1.2.3.4")}))
assert.NoError(t, checkByAllowBlockList("domain.com", []net.IP{net.ParseIP("127.0.0.1")}))

// allow wildcard, block some subdomains. if the domain name is allowed, then the local network check is skipped
init("*.domain.com", "blocked.domain.com", false)
assert.NoError(t, checkByAllowBlockList("sub.domain.com", []net.IP{net.ParseIP("1.2.3.4")}))
assert.NoError(t, checkByAllowBlockList("sub.domain.com", []net.IP{net.ParseIP("127.0.0.1")}))
assert.Error(t, checkByAllowBlockList("blocked.domain.com", []net.IP{net.ParseIP("1.2.3.4")}))
assert.Error(t, checkByAllowBlockList("sub.other.com", []net.IP{net.ParseIP("1.2.3.4")}))

// allow wildcard (it could lead to SSRF in production)
init("*", "", false)
assert.NoError(t, checkByAllowBlockList("domain.com", []net.IP{net.ParseIP("1.2.3.4")}))
assert.NoError(t, checkByAllowBlockList("domain.com", []net.IP{net.ParseIP("127.0.0.1")}))

// local network can still be blocked
init("*", "127.0.0.*", false)
assert.NoError(t, checkByAllowBlockList("domain.com", []net.IP{net.ParseIP("1.2.3.4")}))
assert.Error(t, checkByAllowBlockList("domain.com", []net.IP{net.ParseIP("127.0.0.1")}))

// reset
init("", "", false)
}