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Makes docker images support non-root execution #1031

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merged 7 commits into from
Jun 27, 2024

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Spoffy
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@Spoffy Spoffy commented Jun 11, 2024

De-escalates to a normal user when the docker image is run as root.

Allows GRIST_DOCKER_USER and GRIST_DOCKER_GROUP to be passed to override the default de-escalation behaviour.

Backwards compatible with previous root installations.


This change adds a new docker_entrypoint.sh, which when run as root de-escalates to the provided user, defaulting to grist:grist. This is similar to the approach used by the official postgres docker image.

To achieve backwards compatibility, it changes ownership of any files in /persist to the user it's given at runtime. Since the docker container is typically run as root, this should always work.

If the container is run as a standard user from the very start:

  • It's the admin's responsibility to ensure /persist is writable by that user.
  • /grist remains owned by root and is read-only.

Tested locally in these scenarios:

  • Running current docker image as root with a /persist volume, then this image. ( root -> grist user )
  • Running this image as the base for a new container ( always grist user )
  • Running this image as the base for a new container, under user 1000:1000 ( run container as local machine user )

Addresses:

Defaults to running as grist:grist if executed as root.

Allows GRIST_DOCKER_USER and GRIST_DOCKER_GROUP to be passed to override
the default de-escalation behaviour.
@paulfitz
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Paging also @rouja, it'd be great to get your eyes on this too if you are available (this follows up on #789)

@paulfitz paulfitz self-requested a review June 12, 2024 15:00
@rouja
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rouja commented Jun 12, 2024

Hello,

Nice work !

I built the image locally and did some tests. It seems that the chown on /grist is very very slow. Do you have the same behaviour ?
This would be a problem in k8s because pod will be very long to start...


for dir in "${important_dirs[@]}"; do
# Make sure the target user owns everything that Grist needs read/write access to.
find "$dir" ! -user "$target_user" -exec chown "$target_user" "{}" +
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Why not using chown -R "$target_user" "$dir" instead? For performance reasons?

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@Spoffy Spoffy Jun 12, 2024

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Yeah, this line is derived from the postgres docker image:
https://github.com/docker-library/postgres/blame/29d4a29d8f750c7c55a22199311520de1e1f7f1e/docker-entrypoint.sh#L51

Which was changed from chown as a time save / performance boost in this PR:
docker-library/postgres#463

@Spoffy
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Spoffy commented Jun 12, 2024

Hello,

Nice work !

I built the image locally and did some tests. It seems that the chown on /grist is very very slow. Do you have the same behaviour ? This would be a problem in k8s because pod will be very long to start...

Thanks @rouja!
We could probably get rid of the chown on /grist to be honest, if it's a performance problem. I think it only needs to be readable, so we don't need to change ownership. Would that address that problem?

@rouja
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rouja commented Jun 13, 2024

@Spoffy I just check what I did on a testing deployment on openshift. Actually I do not touch to /grist permissions and I put a volume only on /persist. So I think if /grist is read-only It's Ok.

But maybe we can do the chown on /grist during the build to avoid that files to be owned by root user no matter the final running user ?

@rouja
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rouja commented Jun 13, 2024

I think the issue comes from the fact that /grist is quite big :

root@168e17366122:/grist# du -sh /grist/
695M	/grist/

And when we do the chown we do it on the "docker image layer". For instance if we do something like that :

# We want to avoid running Grist as root if possible.
# Try to setup permissions and de-elevate to a normal user.
if [[ $current_user_id == 0 ]]; then
	target_user=${GRIST_DOCKER_USER:-grist}
	target_group=${GRIST_DOCKER_GROUP:-grist}

	cd /
	mv /grist /grist-sav
	mkdir /grist
	cp -r /grist-sav/* /grist/
	chown -R $target_user:$target_user /grist
	cd /grist

	for dir in "${important_dirs[@]}"; do
		# Make sure the target user owns everything that Grist needs read/write access to.
		id_user=$(id -u $target_user)
		test "$(stat -c "%U" $dir)" = "$target_user" || chown -R $target_user $dir
	done

	# Restart as the target user, replacing the current process (replacement is needed for security).
	# Alternative tools are: setpriv, chroot, gosu.
	exec setpriv --reuid "$target_user" --regid "$target_group" --init-groups /usr/bin/env bash "$BASH_SOURCE" "$@"
fi

The start is much faster but I'm pretty sure that it's not the right way to fix our problem.

@Spoffy
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Spoffy commented Jun 14, 2024

Could you give it a try now @rouja? I moved the permissions changes for /grist into the image itself, which adds 2.2s to the image build (on my machine) but means it doesn't need doing at startup.

It does a mean user can't mount /grist and expect it to just work as another user, but that feels like an edge case to me compared to /persist - I'm not sure it's recommended anywhere to actually do that.

We also gain a little bit of security, as a compromised services wouldn't be able to modify the grist code to serve up malicious content.

@rouja
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rouja commented Jun 14, 2024

Hi,

Looks good to me. @paulfitz what is the process to add a note in the release note ? Even if changes should be backwards-compatible, it's better to be safe than sorry.

# Add a user to allow de-escalating from root on startup
RUN useradd -ms /bin/bash grist
ENV GRIST_DOCKER_USER=grist\
GRIST_DOCKER_GROUP=grist
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Is there a reason why this isn't just a separate ENV stanza?

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@Spoffy Spoffy Jun 24, 2024

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Figured we may as well not create an extra docker layer for it :)

target_user=${GRIST_DOCKER_USER:-grist}
target_group=${GRIST_DOCKER_GROUP:-grist}

for dir in "${important_write_dirs[@]}"; do
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This loops over a one-element, hardcoded array.

What other write dirs are you foreseeing we'll have one day?

In my opinion, until the day comes when we have those directories, we just get rid of this loop and convert import_write_dirs into a scalar.

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Originally, it had /grist in there, which was removed when I realised it was better read-only for performance reasons (chown takes ages).

To be honest - I'm not sure what we'd gain from converting it into a scalar right now? It'd be additional effort now, and more to undo it later if we did end up deciding it was needed.

Future examples may include:

  • Splitting /persist into /data, /config or similar.
  • Fixing any issues if there ends up being a subdirectory of /grist that does need to be writable.

find "$dir" ! -user "$target_user" -exec chown "$target_user" "{}" +
done

# Restart as the target user, replacing the current process (replacement is needed for security).
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What security does exec give us? If we had a parent process, a security hole in setpriv would keep the root process running, and thus potentially exploitable?

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Exactly - exec throws away the parent process running as root.

Digging out the issue, it looks like it was a vuln mentioned in Gosu (an alternative to setpriv), concerning TTYs persisting across privilege boundaries:
tianon/gosu#37

The exec gets rid of the parent shell, which removes vulnerabilities where malicious code can interact with it.


# Restart as the target user, replacing the current process (replacement is needed for security).
# Alternative tools to setpriv are: chroot, gosu.
exec setpriv --reuid "$target_user" --regid "$target_group" --init-groups /usr/bin/env bash "$BASH_SOURCE" "$@"
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Although a valid bashism, I find $BASH_SOURCE a little obscure here, as you're relying on bash's behaviour of $lol being a synonym for ${lol[0]} for an array lol.

Can we just call it $0 instead, as we do with other shell scripts in Grist?

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Can't remember why I chose one over the other - happy to move to $0

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Looks good to me. @paulfitz what is the process to add a note in the release note ? Even if changes should be backwards-compatible, it's better to be safe than sorry.

Current process is to ask @jordigh to bear it in mind for when he writes the notes :-)

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Kicked the tires a bit and it seems to work as expected. Hard to imagine all the permutations of setups out there but this seems OK to me. Thanks @Spoffy !

Good to see our image finally passing its own checks :)
Screenshot from 2024-06-25 15-58-48

Dockerfile Outdated

# Add a user to allow de-escalating from root on startup
RUN useradd -ms /bin/bash grist
ENV GRIST_DOCKER_USER=grist\
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tiny lint: maybe a space before the \ just so separation is immediately clear without needing to mentally process next line

@Spoffy Spoffy merged commit a8431c6 into main Jun 27, 2024
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@Spoffy Spoffy deleted the spoffy/run-docker-as-non-root branch June 27, 2024 13:24
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5 participants