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Add ability to enable user (NAT) network backend #5

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May 31, 2020
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@mborgerson mborgerson merged commit 42f9b28 into master May 31, 2020
@mborgerson mborgerson deleted the ui/net-user branch May 31, 2020 01:52
mborgerson pushed a commit that referenced this pull request May 2, 2021
We can't know the caller read enough data in the memory pointed
by ext_hdr to cast it as a ip6_ext_hdr_routing.
Declare rt_hdr on the stack and fill it again from the iovec.

Since we already checked there is enough data in the iovec buffer,
simply add an assert() call to consume the bytes_read variable.

This fix a 2 bytes buffer overrun in eth_parse_ipv6_hdr() reported
by QEMU fuzzer:

  $ cat << EOF | ./qemu-system-i386 -M pc-q35-5.0 \
    -accel qtest -monitor none \
    -serial none -nographic -qtest stdio
  outl 0xcf8 0x80001010
  outl 0xcfc 0xe1020000
  outl 0xcf8 0x80001004
  outw 0xcfc 0x7
  write 0x25 0x1 0x86
  write 0x26 0x1 0xdd
  write 0x4f 0x1 0x2b
  write 0xe1020030 0x4 0x190002e1
  write 0xe102003a 0x2 0x0807
  write 0xe1020048 0x4 0x12077cdd
  write 0xe1020400 0x4 0xba077cdd
  write 0xe1020420 0x4 0x190002e1
  write 0xe1020428 0x4 0x3509d807
  write 0xe1020438 0x1 0xe2
  EOF
  =================================================================
  ==2859770==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: stack-buffer-overflow on address 0x7ffdef904902 at pc 0x561ceefa78de bp 0x7ffdef904820 sp 0x7ffdef904818
  READ of size 1 at 0x7ffdef904902 thread T0
      #0 0x561ceefa78dd in _eth_get_rss_ex_dst_addr net/eth.c:410:17
      #1 0x561ceefa41fb in eth_parse_ipv6_hdr net/eth.c:532:17
      #2 0x561cef7de639 in net_tx_pkt_parse_headers hw/net/net_tx_pkt.c:228:14
      #3 0x561cef7dbef4 in net_tx_pkt_parse hw/net/net_tx_pkt.c:273:9
      #4 0x561ceec29f22 in e1000e_process_tx_desc hw/net/e1000e_core.c:730:29
      #5 0x561ceec28eac in e1000e_start_xmit hw/net/e1000e_core.c:927:9
      #6 0x561ceec1baab in e1000e_set_tdt hw/net/e1000e_core.c:2444:9
      #7 0x561ceebf300e in e1000e_core_write hw/net/e1000e_core.c:3256:9
      #8 0x561cef3cd4cd in e1000e_mmio_write hw/net/e1000e.c:110:5

  Address 0x7ffdef904902 is located in stack of thread T0 at offset 34 in frame
      #0 0x561ceefa320f in eth_parse_ipv6_hdr net/eth.c:486

    This frame has 1 object(s):
      [32, 34) 'ext_hdr' (line 487) <== Memory access at offset 34 overflows this variable
  HINT: this may be a false positive if your program uses some custom stack unwind mechanism, swapcontext or vfork
        (longjmp and C++ exceptions *are* supported)
  SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: stack-buffer-overflow net/eth.c:410:17 in _eth_get_rss_ex_dst_addr
  Shadow bytes around the buggy address:
    0x10003df188d0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
    0x10003df188e0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
    0x10003df188f0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
    0x10003df18900: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
    0x10003df18910: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 f1 f1 f1 f1
  =>0x10003df18920:[02]f3 f3 f3 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
    0x10003df18930: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
    0x10003df18940: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
    0x10003df18950: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
    0x10003df18960: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
    0x10003df18970: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
  Shadow byte legend (one shadow byte represents 8 application bytes):
    Addressable:           00
    Partially addressable: 01 02 03 04 05 06 07
    Stack left redzone:      f1
    Stack right redzone:     f3
  ==2859770==ABORTING

Add the corresponding qtest case with the fuzzer reproducer.

FWIW GCC 11 similarly reported:

  net/eth.c: In function 'eth_parse_ipv6_hdr':
  net/eth.c:410:15: error: array subscript 'struct ip6_ext_hdr_routing[0]' is partly outside array bounds of 'struct ip6_ext_hdr[1]' [-Werror=array-bounds]
    410 |     if ((rthdr->rtype == 2) && (rthdr->segleft == 1)) {
        |          ~~~~~^~~~~~~
  net/eth.c:485:24: note: while referencing 'ext_hdr'
    485 |     struct ip6_ext_hdr ext_hdr;
        |                        ^~~~~~~
  net/eth.c:410:38: error: array subscript 'struct ip6_ext_hdr_routing[0]' is partly outside array bounds of 'struct ip6_ext_hdr[1]' [-Werror=array-bounds]
    410 |     if ((rthdr->rtype == 2) && (rthdr->segleft == 1)) {
        |                                 ~~~~~^~~~~~~~~
  net/eth.c:485:24: note: while referencing 'ext_hdr'
    485 |     struct ip6_ext_hdr ext_hdr;
        |                        ^~~~~~~

Cc: qemu-stable@nongnu.org
Buglink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/qemu/+bug/1879531
Reported-by: Alexander Bulekov <alxndr@bu.edu>
Reported-by: Miroslav Rezanina <mrezanin@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefano Garzarella <sgarzare@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Miroslav Rezanina <mrezanin@redhat.com>
Fixes: eb70002 ("net_pkt: Extend packet abstraction as required by e1000e functionality")
Signed-off-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
mborgerson pushed a commit that referenced this pull request May 2, 2021
Incoming enabled bitmaps are busy, because we do
bdrv_dirty_bitmap_create_successor() for them. But disabled bitmaps
being migrated are not marked busy, and user can remove them during the
incoming migration. Then we may crash in cancel_incoming_locked() when
try to remove the bitmap that was already removed by user, like this:

 #0  qemu_mutex_lock_impl (mutex=0x5593d88c50d1, file=0x559680554b20
   "../block/dirty-bitmap.c", line=64) at ../util/qemu-thread-posix.c:77
 #1  bdrv_dirty_bitmaps_lock (bs=0x5593d88c0ee9)
   at ../block/dirty-bitmap.c:64
 #2  bdrv_release_dirty_bitmap (bitmap=0x5596810e9570)
   at ../block/dirty-bitmap.c:362
 #3  cancel_incoming_locked (s=0x559680be8208 <dbm_state+40>)
   at ../migration/block-dirty-bitmap.c:918
 #4  dirty_bitmap_load (f=0x559681d02b10, opaque=0x559680be81e0
   <dbm_state>, version_id=1) at ../migration/block-dirty-bitmap.c:1194
 #5  vmstate_load (f=0x559681d02b10, se=0x559680fb5810)
   at ../migration/savevm.c:908
 #6  qemu_loadvm_section_part_end (f=0x559681d02b10,
   mis=0x559680fb4a30) at ../migration/savevm.c:2473
 #7  qemu_loadvm_state_main (f=0x559681d02b10, mis=0x559680fb4a30)
   at ../migration/savevm.c:2626
 #8  postcopy_ram_listen_thread (opaque=0x0)
   at ../migration/savevm.c:1871
 #9  qemu_thread_start (args=0x5596817ccd10)
   at ../util/qemu-thread-posix.c:521
 #10 start_thread () at /lib64/libpthread.so.0
 #11 clone () at /lib64/libc.so.6

Note bs pointer taken from bitmap: it's definitely bad aligned. That's
because we are in use after free, bitmap is already freed.

So, let's make disabled bitmaps (being migrated) busy during incoming
migration.

Signed-off-by: Vladimir Sementsov-Ogievskiy <vsementsov@virtuozzo.com>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20210322094906.5079-2-vsementsov@virtuozzo.com>
mborgerson pushed a commit that referenced this pull request May 2, 2021
When building with --enable-sanitizers we get:

  Direct leak of 32 byte(s) in 2 object(s) allocated from:
      #0 0x5618479ec7cf in malloc (qemu-system-aarch64+0x233b7cf)
      #1 0x7f675745f958 in g_malloc (/lib64/libglib-2.0.so.0+0x58958)
      #2 0x561847f02ca2 in usb_packet_init hw/usb/core.c:531:5
      #3 0x561848df4df4 in usb_ehci_init hw/usb/hcd-ehci.c:2575:5
      #4 0x561847c119ac in ehci_sysbus_init hw/usb/hcd-ehci-sysbus.c:73:5
      #5 0x56184a5bdab8 in object_init_with_type qom/object.c:375:9
      #6 0x56184a5bd955 in object_init_with_type qom/object.c:371:9
      #7 0x56184a5a2bda in object_initialize_with_type qom/object.c:517:5
      #8 0x56184a5a24d5 in object_initialize qom/object.c:536:5
      #9 0x56184a5a2f6c in object_initialize_child_with_propsv qom/object.c:566:5
      #10 0x56184a5a2e60 in object_initialize_child_with_props qom/object.c:549:10
      #11 0x56184a5a3a1e in object_initialize_child_internal qom/object.c:603:5
      #12 0x561849542d18 in npcm7xx_init hw/arm/npcm7xx.c:427:5

Similarly to commit d710e1e ("usb: ehci: fix memory leak in
ehci"), fix by calling usb_ehci_finalize() to free the USBPacket.

Fixes: 7341ea0
Signed-off-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <f4bug@amsat.org>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Huth <thuth@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20210323183701.281152-1-f4bug@amsat.org>
Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
mborgerson pushed a commit that referenced this pull request May 2, 2021
When building with --enable-sanitizers we get:

  Direct leak of 16 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from:
      #0 0x5618479ec7cf in malloc (qemu-system-aarch64+0x233b7cf)
      #1 0x7f675745f958 in g_malloc (/lib64/libglib-2.0.so.0+0x58958)
      #2 0x561847c2dcc9 in xlnx_dp_init hw/display/xlnx_dp.c:1259:5
      #3 0x56184a5bdab8 in object_init_with_type qom/object.c:375:9
      #4 0x56184a5a2bda in object_initialize_with_type qom/object.c:517:5
      #5 0x56184a5a24d5 in object_initialize qom/object.c:536:5
      #6 0x56184a5a2f6c in object_initialize_child_with_propsv qom/object.c:566:5
      #7 0x56184a5a2e60 in object_initialize_child_with_props qom/object.c:549:10
      #8 0x56184a5a3a1e in object_initialize_child_internal qom/object.c:603:5
      #9 0x5618495aa431 in xlnx_zynqmp_init hw/arm/xlnx-zynqmp.c:273:5

The RX/TX FIFOs are created in xlnx_dp_init(), add xlnx_dp_finalize()
to destroy them.

Fixes: 58ac482 ("introduce xlnx-dp")
Signed-off-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <f4bug@amsat.org>
Reviewed-by: Alistair Francis <alistair.francis@wdc.com>
Message-id: 20210323182958.277654-1-f4bug@amsat.org
Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
mborgerson pushed a commit that referenced this pull request May 2, 2021
g_hash_table_add always retains ownership of the pointer passed in as
the key. Its return status merely indicates whether the added entry was
new, or replaced an existing entry. Thus key must never be freed after
this method returns.

Spotted by ASAN:

==2407186==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-use-after-free on address 0x6020003ac4f0 at pc 0x7ffff766659c bp 0x7fffffffd1d0 sp 0x7fffffffc980
READ of size 1 at 0x6020003ac4f0 thread T0
    #0 0x7ffff766659b  (/lib64/libasan.so.6+0x8a59b)
    #1 0x7ffff6bfa843 in g_str_equal ../glib/ghash.c:2303
    #2 0x7ffff6bf8167 in g_hash_table_lookup_node ../glib/ghash.c:493
    #3 0x7ffff6bf9b78 in g_hash_table_insert_internal ../glib/ghash.c:1598
    #4 0x7ffff6bf9c32 in g_hash_table_add ../glib/ghash.c:1689
    #5 0x5555596caad4 in module_load_one ../util/module.c:233
    #6 0x5555596ca949 in module_load_one ../util/module.c:225
    #7 0x5555596ca949 in module_load_one ../util/module.c:225
    #8 0x5555596cbdf4 in module_load_qom_all ../util/module.c:349

Typical C bug...

Fixes: 9062912 ("module: use g_hash_table_add()")
Cc: qemu-stable@nongnu.org
Signed-off-by: Marc-André Lureau <marcandre.lureau@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20210316134456.3243102-1-marcandre.lureau@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com>
mborgerson pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Sep 5, 2021
backtrace:
'0x00007ffff5f44ec2 in __ibv_dereg_mr_1_1 (mr=0x7fff1007d390) at /home/lizhijian/rdma-core/libibverbs/verbs.c:478
478             void *addr              = mr->addr;
(gdb) bt
 #0  0x00007ffff5f44ec2 in __ibv_dereg_mr_1_1 (mr=0x7fff1007d390) at /home/lizhijian/rdma-core/libibverbs/verbs.c:478
 #1  0x0000555555891fcc in rdma_delete_block (block=<optimized out>, rdma=0x7fff38176010) at ../migration/rdma.c:691
 #2  qemu_rdma_cleanup (rdma=0x7fff38176010) at ../migration/rdma.c:2365
 #3  0x00005555558925b0 in qio_channel_rdma_close_rcu (rcu=0x555556b8b6c0) at ../migration/rdma.c:3073
 #4  0x0000555555d652a3 in call_rcu_thread (opaque=opaque@entry=0x0) at ../util/rcu.c:281
 #5  0x0000555555d5edf9 in qemu_thread_start (args=0x7fffe88bb4d0) at ../util/qemu-thread-posix.c:541
 #6  0x00007ffff54c73f9 in start_thread () at /lib64/libpthread.so.0
 #7  0x00007ffff53f3b03 in clone () at /lib64/libc.so.6 '

Signed-off-by: Li Zhijian <lizhijian@cn.fujitsu.com>
Message-Id: <20210708144521.1959614-1-lizhijian@cn.fujitsu.com>
Reviewed-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
mborgerson pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Sep 5, 2021
When building the 'microvm' machine stand-alone we get:

  $ qemu-system-x86_64 -M microvm
  **
  ERROR:qom/object.c:714:object_new_with_type: assertion failed: (type != NULL)
  Bail out! ERROR:qom/object.c:714:object_new_with_type: assertion failed: (type != NULL)
  Aborted (core dumped)

Looking at the backtrace:

  (gdb) bt
  #3  0x00007ff2330492ff in g_assertion_message_expr () at /lib64/libglib-2.0.so.0
  #4  0x000055a878c18341 in object_new_with_type (type=<optimized out>) at qom/object.c:714
  #5  0x000055a878c18399 in object_new (typename=typename@entry=0x55a878dec36a "isa-pit") at qom/object.c:747
  #6  0x000055a878cc8146 in qdev_new (name=name@entry=0x55a878dec36a "isa-pit") at hw/core/qdev.c:153
  #7  0x000055a878a8b439 in isa_new (name=name@entry=0x55a878dec36a "isa-pit") at hw/isa/isa-bus.c:160
  #8  0x000055a878adb782 in i8254_pit_init (base=64, isa_irq=0, alt_irq=0x0, bus=0x55a87ab38760) at include/hw/timer/i8254.h:54
  #9  microvm_devices_init (mms=0x55a87ac36800) at hw/i386/microvm.c:263
  #10 microvm_machine_state_init (machine=<optimized out>) at hw/i386/microvm.c:471
  #11 0x000055a878a944ab in machine_run_board_init (machine=machine@entry=0x55a87ac36800) at hw/core/machine.c:1239

The "isa-pit" type (TYPE_I8254) is missing. Add it.

Fixes: 0ebf007 ("hw/i386: Introduce the microvm machine type")
Signed-off-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20210616204328.2611406-24-philmd@redhat.com>
mborgerson pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Sep 5, 2021
When building the Pegasos2 machine stand-alone we get:

  $ qemu-system-ppc -M pegasos2 -bios pegasos2.rom
  ERROR:qom/object.c:714:object_new_with_type: assertion failed: (type != NULL)
  Bail out! ERROR:qom/object.c:714:object_new_with_type: assertion failed: (type != NULL)

Looking at the backtraces:

  Thread 1 "qemu-system-ppc" received signal SIGABRT, Aborted.
  (gdb) bt
  #0  0x00007ffff53877d5 in raise () at /lib64/libc.so.6
  #1  0x00007ffff5370895 in abort () at /lib64/libc.so.6
  #2  0x00007ffff6dc4b6c in g_assertion_message_expr.cold () at /lib64/libglib-2.0.so.0
  #3  0x00007ffff6e229ff in g_assertion_message_expr () at /lib64/libglib-2.0.so.0
  #4  0x0000555555a0c8f4 in object_new_with_type (type=0x0) at qom/object.c:714
  #5  0x0000555555a0c9d5 in object_new (typename=0x555555c7afe4 "isa-pit") at qom/object.c:747
  #6  0x0000555555a053b8 in qdev_new (name=0x555555c7afe4 "isa-pit") at hw/core/qdev.c:153
  #7  0x00005555557cdd05 in isa_new (name=0x555555c7afe4 "isa-pit") at hw/isa/isa-bus.c:160
  #8  0x00005555557cf518 in i8254_pit_init (bus=0x55555603d140, base=64, isa_irq=0, alt_irq=0x0) at include/hw/timer/i8254.h:54
  #9  0x00005555557d12f9 in vt8231_realize (d=0x5555563d9770, errp=0x7fffffffcc28) at hw/isa/vt82c686.c:704

  (gdb) bt
  #0  0x00007ffff54bd7d5 in raise () at /lib64/libc.so.6
  #1  0x00007ffff54a6895 in abort () at /lib64/libc.so.6
  #2  0x00005555558f7796 in object_new (typename=0x555555ad4889 "isa-parallel") at qom/object.c:749
  #3  object_new (typename=type0x555555ad4889 "isa-parallel") at qom/object.c:743
  #4  0x00005555558f0d46 in qdev_new (name=0x555555ad4889 "isa-parallel") at hw/core/qdev.c:153
  #5  0x000055555576b669 in isa_new (name=0x555555ad4889 "isa-parallel") at hw/isa/isa-bus.c:160
  #6  0x000055555576bbe8 in isa_superio_realize (dev=0x555555f15910, errp=<optimized out>) at hw/isa/isa-superio.c:54
  #7  0x000055555576d5ed in via_superio_realize (d=0x555555f15910, errp=0x7fffffffcb30) at hw/isa/vt82c686.c:292
  #8  0x00005555558f12c1 in device_set_realized (obj=<optimized out>, ...) at hw/core/qdev.c:761
  #9  0x00005555558f5066 in property_set_bool (obj=0x555555f15910, ..., errp=0x7fffffffcbb0) at qom/object.c:2262
  #10 0x00005555558f7f38 in object_property_set (obj=0x555555f15910, name=0x555555b1b1e3 "realized", ...) at qom/object.c:1407
  #11 0x00005555558fb2d0 in object_property_set_qobject (obj=0x555555f15910, name=0x555555b1b1e3 "realized", ...) at qom/qom-qobject.c:28
  #12 0x00005555558f8525 in object_property_set_bool (obj=0x555555f15910, name=0x555555b1b1e3 "realized", ...) at qom/object.c:1477
  #13 0x00005555558f18ee in qdev_realize (dev=0x555555f15910, bus=0x55555602a610, errp=<optimized out>) at hw/core/qdev.c:389
  #14 0x00005555558f197f in qdev_realize_and_unref (dev=0x555555f15910, bus=0x55555602a610, errp=<optimized out>) at hw/core/qdev.c:396
  #15 0x000055555576b709 in isa_realize_and_unref (errp=<optimized out>, bus=0x55555602a610, dev=0x555555f15910) at hw/isa/isa-bus.c:179
  #16 isa_create_simple (bus=0x55555602a610, name=0x555555adc33b "vt8231-superio") at hw/isa/isa-bus.c:173
  #17 0x000055555576d9b7 in vt8231_realize (d=0x555556186a50, errp=<optimized out>) at hw/isa/vt82c686.c:706

The "isa-pit" type (TYPE_I8254) and "isa-parallel" are missing. Add them.

Signed-off-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <f4bug@amsat.org>
Reviewed-by: BALATON Zoltan <balaton@eik.bme.hu>
Reviewed-by: Bin Meng <bmeng.cn@gmail.com>
Message-Id: <20210515173716.358295-12-philmd@redhat.com>
[PMD: Added "isa-parallel" later]
mborgerson pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Sep 5, 2021
OSS-Fuzz found sending illegal addresses when querying the write
protection bits triggers the assertion added in commit 84816fb
("hw/sd/sdcard: Assert if accessing an illegal group"):

  qemu-fuzz-i386-target-generic-fuzz-sdhci-v3: ../hw/sd/sd.c:824: uint32_t sd_wpbits(SDState *, uint64_t):
  Assertion `wpnum < sd->wpgrps_size' failed.
  #3 0x7f62a8b22c91 in __assert_fail
  #4 0x5569adcec405 in sd_wpbits hw/sd/sd.c:824:9
  #5 0x5569adce5f6d in sd_normal_command hw/sd/sd.c:1389:38
  #6 0x5569adce3870 in sd_do_command hw/sd/sd.c:1737:17
  #7 0x5569adcf1566 in sdbus_do_command hw/sd/core.c:100:16
  #8 0x5569adcfc192 in sdhci_send_command hw/sd/sdhci.c:337:12
  #9 0x5569adcfa3a3 in sdhci_write hw/sd/sdhci.c:1186:9
  #10 0x5569adfb3447 in memory_region_write_accessor softmmu/memory.c:492:5

It is legal for the CMD30 to query for out-of-range addresses.
Such invalid addresses are simply ignored in the response (write
protection bits set to 0).

In commit 84816fb ("hw/sd/sdcard: Assert if accessing an illegal
group") we misplaced the assertion *before* we test the address is
in range. Move it *after*.

Include the qtest reproducer provided by Alexander Bulekov:

  $ make check-qtest-i386
  ...
  Running test qtest-i386/fuzz-sdcard-test
  qemu-system-i386: ../hw/sd/sd.c:824: sd_wpbits: Assertion `wpnum < sd->wpgrps_size' failed.

Cc: qemu-stable@nongnu.org
Reported-by: OSS-Fuzz (Issue 29225)
Suggested-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
Fixes: 84816fb ("hw/sd/sdcard: Assert if accessing an illegal group")
Resolves: https://gitlab.com/qemu-project/qemu/-/issues/495
Signed-off-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <f4bug@amsat.org>
Message-Id: <20210802235524.3417739-3-f4bug@amsat.org>
Reviewed-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
Tested-by: Alexander Bulekov <alxndr@bu.edu>
mborgerson pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Sep 5, 2021
This reverts commit 0cf8882.

Which this commit, with aarch64 when using efi PCI devices with IO ports
do not work.  The reason is that EFI creates I/O port mappings below
0x1000 (in fact, at 0). However Linux, for legacy reasons, does not
support I/O ports <= 0x1000 on PCI, so the I/O assignment created by EFI
is rejected.

EFI creates the mappings primarily for itself, and up until DSM #5
started to be enforced, all PCI resource allocations that existed at
boot were ignored by Linux and recreated from scratch.

Also, the commit in question looks dubious - it seems unlikely that
Linux would fail to create a resource tree. What does
happen is that BARs get moved around, which may cause trouble in some
cases: for instance, Linux had to add special code to the EFI framebuffer
driver to copy with framebuffer BARs being relocated.

DSM #5 has a long history of debate and misinterpretation.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210724185234.GA2265457@roeck-us.net/
Fixes: 0cf8882 ("acpi/gpex: Inform os to keep firmware resource map")
Reported-by: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>
Suggested-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Tested-by: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
mborgerson pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Jul 17, 2023
After live migration with virtio block device, qemu crash at:

	#0  0x000055914f46f795 in object_dynamic_cast_assert (obj=0x559151b7b090, typename=0x55914f80fbc4 "qio-channel", file=0x55914f80fb90 "/images/testvfe/sw/qemu.gerrit/include/io/channel.h", line=30, func=0x55914f80fcb8 <__func__.17257> "QIO_CHANNEL") at ../qom/object.c:872
	#1  0x000055914f480d68 in QIO_CHANNEL (obj=0x559151b7b090) at /images/testvfe/sw/qemu.gerrit/include/io/channel.h:29
	#2  0x000055914f4812f8 in qio_net_listener_set_client_func_full (listener=0x559151b7a720, func=0x55914f580b97 <tcp_chr_accept>, data=0x5591519f4ea0, notify=0x0, context=0x0) at ../io/net-listener.c:166
	#3  0x000055914f580059 in tcp_chr_update_read_handler (chr=0x5591519f4ea0) at ../chardev/char-socket.c:637
	#4  0x000055914f583dca in qemu_chr_be_update_read_handlers (s=0x5591519f4ea0, context=0x0) at ../chardev/char.c:226
	#5  0x000055914f57b7c9 in qemu_chr_fe_set_handlers_full (b=0x559152bf23a0, fd_can_read=0x0, fd_read=0x0, fd_event=0x0, be_change=0x0, opaque=0x0, context=0x0, set_open=false, sync_state=true) at ../chardev/char-fe.c:279
	#6  0x000055914f57b86d in qemu_chr_fe_set_handlers (b=0x559152bf23a0, fd_can_read=0x0, fd_read=0x0, fd_event=0x0, be_change=0x0, opaque=0x0, context=0x0, set_open=false) at ../chardev/char-fe.c:304
	#7  0x000055914f378caf in vhost_user_async_close (d=0x559152bf21a0, chardev=0x559152bf23a0, vhost=0x559152bf2420, cb=0x55914f2fb8c1 <vhost_user_blk_disconnect>) at ../hw/virtio/vhost-user.c:2725
	#8  0x000055914f2fba40 in vhost_user_blk_event (opaque=0x559152bf21a0, event=CHR_EVENT_CLOSED) at ../hw/block/vhost-user-blk.c:395
	#9  0x000055914f58388c in chr_be_event (s=0x5591519f4ea0, event=CHR_EVENT_CLOSED) at ../chardev/char.c:61
	#10 0x000055914f583905 in qemu_chr_be_event (s=0x5591519f4ea0, event=CHR_EVENT_CLOSED) at ../chardev/char.c:81
	#11 0x000055914f581275 in char_socket_finalize (obj=0x5591519f4ea0) at ../chardev/char-socket.c:1083
	#12 0x000055914f46f073 in object_deinit (obj=0x5591519f4ea0, type=0x5591519055c0) at ../qom/object.c:680
	#13 0x000055914f46f0e5 in object_finalize (data=0x5591519f4ea0) at ../qom/object.c:694
	#14 0x000055914f46ff06 in object_unref (objptr=0x5591519f4ea0) at ../qom/object.c:1202
	#15 0x000055914f4715a4 in object_finalize_child_property (obj=0x559151b76c50, name=0x559151b7b250 "char3", opaque=0x5591519f4ea0) at ../qom/object.c:1747
	#16 0x000055914f46ee86 in object_property_del_all (obj=0x559151b76c50) at ../qom/object.c:632
	#17 0x000055914f46f0d2 in object_finalize (data=0x559151b76c50) at ../qom/object.c:693
	#18 0x000055914f46ff06 in object_unref (objptr=0x559151b76c50) at ../qom/object.c:1202
	#19 0x000055914f4715a4 in object_finalize_child_property (obj=0x559151b6b560, name=0x559151b76630 "chardevs", opaque=0x559151b76c50) at ../qom/object.c:1747
	#20 0x000055914f46ef67 in object_property_del_child (obj=0x559151b6b560, child=0x559151b76c50) at ../qom/object.c:654
	#21 0x000055914f46f042 in object_unparent (obj=0x559151b76c50) at ../qom/object.c:673
	#22 0x000055914f58632a in qemu_chr_cleanup () at ../chardev/char.c:1189
	#23 0x000055914f16c66c in qemu_cleanup () at ../softmmu/runstate.c:830
	#24 0x000055914eee7b9e in qemu_default_main () at ../softmmu/main.c:38
	#25 0x000055914eee7bcc in main (argc=86, argv=0x7ffc97cb8d88) at ../softmmu/main.c:48

In char_socket_finalize after s->listener freed, event callback function
vhost_user_blk_event will be called to handle CHR_EVENT_CLOSED.
vhost_user_blk_event is calling qio_net_listener_set_client_func_full which
is still using s->listener.

Setting s->listener = NULL after object_unref(OBJECT(s->listener)) can
solve this issue.

Signed-off-by: Yajun Wu <yajunw@nvidia.com>
Acked-by: Jiri Pirko <jiri@nvidia.com>
Message-Id: <20230214021430.3638579-1-yajunw@nvidia.com>
Reviewed-by: Marc-André Lureau <marcandre.lureau@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit b8a7f51)
Signed-off-by: Michael Tokarev <mjt@tls.msk.ru>
mborgerson pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Jul 17, 2023
For ex, when resetting the xlnx-zcu102 machine:

(lldb) bt
* thread #1, queue = 'com.apple.main-thread', stop reason =
EXC_BAD_ACCESS (code=1, address=0x50)
   * frame #0: 0x10020a740 gd_vc_send_chars(vc=0x000000000) at
gtk.c:1759:41 [opt]
     frame #1: 0x100636264 qemu_chr_fe_accept_input(be=<unavailable>) at
char-fe.c:159:9 [opt]
     frame #2: 0x1000608e0 cadence_uart_reset_hold [inlined]
uart_rx_reset(s=0x10810a960) at cadence_uart.c:158:5 [opt]
     frame #3: 0x1000608d4 cadence_uart_reset_hold(obj=0x10810a960) at
cadence_uart.c:530:5 [opt]
     frame #4: 0x100580ab4 resettable_phase_hold(obj=0x10810a960,
opaque=0x000000000, type=<unavailable>) at resettable.c:0 [opt]
     frame #5: 0x10057d1b0 bus_reset_child_foreach(obj=<unavailable>,
cb=(resettable_phase_hold at resettable.c:162), opaque=0x000000000,
type=RESET_TYPE_COLD) at bus.c:97:13 [opt]
     frame #6: 0x1005809f8 resettable_phase_hold [inlined]
resettable_child_foreach(rc=0x000060000332d2c0, obj=0x0000600002c1c180,
cb=<unavailable>, opaque=0x000000000, type=RESET_TYPE_COLD) at
resettable.c:96:9 [opt]
     frame #7: 0x1005809d8 resettable_phase_hold(obj=0x0000600002c1c180,
opaque=0x000000000, type=RESET_TYPE_COLD) at resettable.c:173:5 [opt]
     frame #8: 0x1005803a0
resettable_assert_reset(obj=0x0000600002c1c180, type=<unavailable>) at
resettable.c:60:5 [opt]
     frame #9: 0x10058027c resettable_reset(obj=0x0000600002c1c180,
type=RESET_TYPE_COLD) at resettable.c:45:5 [opt]

While the chardev is created early, the VirtualConsole is associated
after, during qemu_init_displays().

Signed-off-by: Marc-André Lureau <marcandre.lureau@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@linaro.org>
Message-Id: <20230220072251.3385878-1-marcandre.lureau@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit 49152ac)
Signed-off-by: Michael Tokarev <mjt@tls.msk.ru>
mborgerson pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Jul 17, 2023
Command "qemu-system-riscv64 -machine virt
-m 2G -smp 1 -numa node,mem=1G -numa node,mem=1G"
would trigger this problem.Backtrace with:
 #0  0x0000555555b5b1a4 in riscv_numa_get_default_cpu_node_id  at ../hw/riscv/numa.c:211
 #1  0x00005555558ce510 in machine_numa_finish_cpu_init  at ../hw/core/machine.c:1230
 #2  0x00005555558ce9d3 in machine_run_board_init  at ../hw/core/machine.c:1346
 #3  0x0000555555aaedc3 in qemu_init_board  at ../softmmu/vl.c:2513
 #4  0x0000555555aaf064 in qmp_x_exit_preconfig  at ../softmmu/vl.c:2609
 #5  0x0000555555ab1916 in qemu_init  at ../softmmu/vl.c:3617
 #6  0x000055555585463b in main  at ../softmmu/main.c:47
This commit fixes the issue by adding parameter checks.

Reviewed-by: Alistair Francis <alistair.francis@wdc.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Henrique Barboza <dbarboza@ventanamicro.com>
Reviewed-by: LIU Zhiwei <zhiwei_liu@linux.alibaba.com>
Reviewed-by: Weiwei Li <liweiwei@iscas.ac.cn>
Signed-off-by: Yin Wang <yin.wang@intel.com>
Message-Id: <20230519023758.1759434-1-yin.wang@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Alistair Francis <alistair.francis@wdc.com>
(cherry picked from commit b9cedbf19cb4be04908a3a623f0f237875483499)
Signed-off-by: Michael Tokarev <mjt@tls.msk.ru>
mborgerson pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Jul 17, 2023
vhost_dev_start function does not release memory_listener object
in case of an error. This may crash the guest when vhost is unable
to set memory table:

  stack trace of thread 125653:
  Program terminated with signal SIGSEGV, Segmentation fault
  #0  memory_listener_register (qemu-kvm + 0x6cda0f)
  #1  vhost_dev_start (qemu-kvm + 0x699301)
  #2  vhost_net_start (qemu-kvm + 0x45b03f)
  #3  virtio_net_set_status (qemu-kvm + 0x665672)
  #4  qmp_set_link (qemu-kvm + 0x548fd5)
  #5  net_vhost_user_event (qemu-kvm + 0x552c45)
  #6  tcp_chr_connect (qemu-kvm + 0x88d473)
  #7  tcp_chr_new_client (qemu-kvm + 0x88cf83)
  #8  tcp_chr_accept (qemu-kvm + 0x88b429)
  #9  qio_net_listener_channel_func (qemu-kvm + 0x7ac07c)
  #10 g_main_context_dispatch (libglib-2.0.so.0 + 0x54e2f)

Release memory_listener objects in the error path.

Signed-off-by: Prasad Pandit <pjp@fedoraproject.org>
Message-Id: <20230529114333.31686-2-ppandit@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com>
Fixes: c471ad0 ("vhost_net: device IOTLB support")
Cc: qemu-stable@nongnu.org
Acked-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit 1e3ffb34f764f8ac4c003b2b2e6a775b2b073a16)
Signed-off-by: Michael Tokarev <mjt@tls.msk.ru>
Florin9doi pushed a commit to Florin9doi/xemu that referenced this pull request Jul 17, 2023
Fix warnings such:

  disas/nanomips.c:3251:64: warning: format specifies type 'char *' but the argument has type 'int64' (aka 'long long') [-Wformat]
    return img_format("CACHE 0x%" PRIx64 ", %s(%s)", op_value, s_value, rs);
                                            ~~                 ^~~~~~~
                                            %lld

To avoid crashes such (kernel from commit f375ad6):

  $ qemu-system-mipsel -cpu I7200 -d in_asm -kernel generic_nano32r6el_page4k
  ...
  ----------------
  IN: __bzero
  0x805c6084:  20c4 6950      ADDU r13, a0, a2
  0x805c6088:  9089           ADDIU a0, 1
  Process 70261 stopped
  * thread xemu-project#6, stop reason = EXC_BAD_ACCESS (code=1, address=0xfffffffffffffff0)
      frame #0: 0x00000001bfe38864 libsystem_platform.dylib`_platform_strlen + 4
  libsystem_platform.dylib`:
  ->  0x1bfe38864 <+4>:  ldr    q0, [x1]
      0x1bfe38868 <+8>:  adr    x3, #-0xc8                ; ___lldb_unnamed_symbol314
      0x1bfe3886c <+12>: ldr    q2, [x3], #0x10
      0x1bfe38870 <+16>: and    x2, x0, #0xf
  Target 0: (qemu-system-mipsel) stopped.
  (lldb) bt
  * thread xemu-project#6, stop reason = EXC_BAD_ACCESS (code=1, address=0xfffffffffffffff0)
    * frame #0: 0x00000001bfe38864 libsystem_platform.dylib`_platform_strlen + 4
      frame xemu-project#1: 0x00000001bfce76a0 libsystem_c.dylib`__vfprintf + 4544
      frame #2: 0x00000001bfd158b4 libsystem_c.dylib`_vasprintf + 280
      frame #3: 0x0000000101c22fb0 libglib-2.0.0.dylib`g_vasprintf + 28
      frame xemu-project#4: 0x0000000101bfb7d8 libglib-2.0.0.dylib`g_strdup_vprintf + 32
      frame xemu-project#5: 0x000000010000fb70 qemu-system-mipsel`img_format(format=<unavailable>) at nanomips.c:103:14 [opt]
      frame xemu-project#6: 0x0000000100018868 qemu-system-mipsel`SB_S9_(instruction=<unavailable>, info=<unavailable>) at nanomips.c:12616:12 [opt]
      frame xemu-project#7: 0x000000010000f90c qemu-system-mipsel`print_insn_nanomips at nanomips.c:589:28 [opt]

Fixes: 4066c15 ("disas/nanomips: Remove IMMEDIATE functions")
Reported-by: Stefan Weil <sw@weilnetz.de>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Weil <sw@weilnetz.de>
Signed-off-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@linaro.org>
Message-Id: <20221101114458.25756-2-philmd@linaro.org>
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