Use time-constant comparison for CSRF tokens in endpoint #10157
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joheriks
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This hardens the framework against a theoretical timing attack based on comparing how quickly a request with an invalid CSRF token is rejected. No tests since this functionality is equivalent to the previous implementation aside from timing differences that would be very fragile to verify in an automated test. Related to #9875
vaadin-bot
pushed a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Mar 2, 2021
This hardens the framework against a theoretical timing attack based on comparing how quickly a request with an invalid CSRF token is rejected. No tests since this functionality is equivalent to the previous implementation aside from timing differences that would be very fragile to verify in an automated test. Related to #9875
vaadin-bot
pushed a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Mar 2, 2021
This hardens the framework against a theoretical timing attack based on comparing how quickly a request with an invalid CSRF token is rejected. No tests since this functionality is equivalent to the previous implementation aside from timing differences that would be very fragile to verify in an automated test. Related to #9875
vaadin-bot
pushed a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Mar 2, 2021
This hardens the framework against a theoretical timing attack based on comparing how quickly a request with an invalid CSRF token is rejected. No tests since this functionality is equivalent to the previous implementation aside from timing differences that would be very fragile to verify in an automated test. Related to #9875
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This hardens the framework against a theoretical timing attack based on
comparing how quickly a request with an invalid CSRF token is rejected.
No tests since this functionality is equivalent to the previous implementation aside from timing differences that would be very fragile to verify in an automated test.
Related to #9875